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Registering Relationships
Erez Aloni*
Despite the damatic changes in family structure in the past decades-imcludng the
unprecedented and skyrocketing number of families who live in nonmantal arrangemenis-
marnage and marnage-mrmc institutions remain the only legal options for the recognition of
rlationships. This regulatory regime leaves millions of Americans without the means to
estabhlish and protect relationshipj ghts. This Article suggests that the legal issues adsig from
nonmantal relationships would be best addressed ifmore options for legal recognition of such
relationships were offered Accordngly this Article presents the primary primciples of a
registration-based marrage alternative that is founded on contract: "egistered contractual
relationships" (RCRs). This legal institution would offer couples the option to sign-and
deposit with the state-a contract defiing the partners' obligations and rights vis-d-vis one
another and changing their status to that of '"egistered partners." Registered partners would
receive most of the ights and benefits that the state provides for marined couples. Registration
would not requie a solenmization process nor any ceremonial or religious component and
would provide an easy way to dissolve relationships in cases where couples do not have minor
children.
This model enjoys the flexibility of contracts and the certainty of official registration. It
promotes greater autonomy in family formation in two ways: it allows more choice among
state-sanctioned mechanisms, and it allows people to design the terms of their rlationships,
rather than imposig the one-size-fits-all structure of mariage. The introduction of RCRs
would have far-reaching legal and societal consequences. RCRs would provide a functional
model for registration and termination ofpartnerships, offer an alternative that is not associated
with marrnage's symbolism and that acts to reduce the harm that symbolism crates, and
accommodate a wide range of famly strictures. At the same time, they would efficiently
address the statek need to regulate some aspects ofmlationships in the interest ofavoidig and
mediating conlicts and of encouraging couples to think about and negotiate theirnghts early in
their elationships. The Article also looks at the success of the French Pacte Civil de Solidarit6
(PACS)-a model thatresem bles RCRs and provides important lessons to the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For many American lawmakers-Republicans and Democrats
alike-the solution to most of the problems that the American family
faces is in encouraging more marriages. Indeed, "Marriage is the
foundation of a successful society," the United States Congress
announced in 1996.' It is key to the family's health, wealth, well-
being, and stability, as well as the best environment to raise children.
To support this policy, marriage is singled out as the only legal
institution worthy for recognition of relationships. Hundreds of
millions of dollars are invested in programs that aim to advance
"healthy marriages and responsible fatherhood" 2 a few states have
enacted covenant marriage in an attempt to reduce divorce rates,' and
social welfare programs are designed to penalize unmarried mothers.!
But such a policy not only fails to convince some people to get
married (as is evident from the skyrocketing number of nonmarital
unions in the United States); it makes the situation of millions of
people in nonmarital arrangements worse by leaving them outside the
scope of state protection and recognition.
American scholars have come up with numerous proposals to
correct these inequities.! One approach calls for the abolition of
marriage and the adoption of a deregulation regime, in which couples
1. What Is MffJ ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/mission.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013).
2. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law Stigma, and Discrnmation
Against Nonmantal Children, 63 FLA. L. REv 345, 3 80-85 (2011) (describing federal and
states measures to promote marriage).
3. See infm Part IVC (discussing covenant marriage).
4. See Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses M the Welfare Police
State, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 79, 79-83 (2001) (explaining how the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act penalizes unmarried
women).
5. See generlly Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship Recognition for
Couples Regardless of Sex: Aboliton, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 LAW & INEQ.
345 (2010) (surveying three alternative approaches for full relationship recognition:
abolition, the menu-of-alternatives approach, and functionalism).
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would only use contracts to establish the obligations between
themselves.' Another approach asks to impose quasimarital status on
cohabiting couples upon fulfillment of certain behaviors. Yet another
would expand the menu of options for legal recognition of
relationships to include various legal institutions that would recognize
relationships.! But all these approaches, as currently constructed, de
facto diminish people's choices among a variety of supportive and
well-functioning state-sanctioned institutions for legal recognition of
relationship.
This Article suggests that the legal issues arising from the
prevalence of cohabitation and other nonmarital living arrangements
would be best addressed if more options for legal recognition of
various unions were offered. It argues that if policy makers genuinely
care about strengthening the American family, the best way to do that
is by offering an additional registration scheme-one that is different
from marriage. This scheme needs to respond to and be suitable for
the diverse family structures that already exist in the United States and
their legal needs. Adopting such a model, this Article contends, would
bring more people under the scope of state regulation and protection
than the current legal regime does.
Accordingly, this Article presents the primary principles of a
registration-based marriage alternative. It offers an innovative and
sophisticated opt-in model based on contract. I call this model
"registered contractual relationships" (RCRs). This legal institution
would offer couples the option to sign-and deposit with the state-a
contract defining the partners' obligations and rights vis-A-vis each
other and changing their status to that of "registered partners."
Registered partners would receive most of the rights and benefits that
the state provides for married couples, such as the ability to sponsor
your registered partner (even if it is a nonintimate partner) for
admission to the United States. However, these couples would be able
to choose which personal rights and obligations between themselves
(such as visitation rights and end-of-life decisions) they want to
designate. Registration would not require a solemnization process nor
any ceremonial or religious component and would provide an easy way
to dissolve the relationship in cases where the couple does not have
minor children.
6. See infra Part IVB (explaining and critiquing the abolitionist approach).
7. See mzfim Part IVD (explaining and critiquing the functionalist approach).
8. See infim Part IVC (explaining and critiquing the menu-of-options approach).
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This model enjoys the advantages of both worlds: the flexibility
of contracts and the certainty of official registration. It promotes
greater autonomy in family formation in two ways: it allows more
choice between two state-sanctioned mechanisms (the RCR and
marriage), and at the same time, it allows individuals to design the
terms of their relationships, rather than imposing the one-size-fits-all
structure of marriage. The plasticity of RCRs and the fact that couples
set their degree of commitment mean that RCRs could be used by
people in different stages of their relationships and in diverse types of
families (including registration of nonromantic partners). For
example, RCRs could be used by couples in their premarital stage and
would include very few obligations between the partners; at the same
time, it could serve as a "marriage without the name" for couples who
want the commitment to each other but who reject marriage's
historical, patriarchal, or religious connotations.
The introduction of a competitive alternative to marriage based
on a contract recognized by the state would have far-reaching legal and
societal consequences. It would provide a functional model for
registration and termination of partnerships, and it would offer an
alternative that is not associated with marriage's symbolism and acts to
reduce the harm that symbolism creates. At the same time, it would
efficiently address the state's need to regulate some aspects of people's
relationships in the interest of avoiding and mediating potential
conflict and of encouraging couples to think about and negotiate their
rights early on in their relationships.
A real-life laboratory of RCR-like alternatives already exists in
France and Belgium and provides an invaluable lesson for the United
States. These marriage alternatives are different from civil unions in
other countries in that they are not "marriage by a different name";
they are registered cohabitation.! The success of these alternatives is
evident from, inter alia, the large number of opposite-sex couples who
choose them over marriage. In France, the Pacte Civil de Solidarit&
(PACS) is open to both opposite- and same-sex couples; more than a
million PACSs have been registered since the form's 1999 enactment,
with the number of registered couples increasing every year. In 2008,
9. For the purposes of this Article, I use the terms "civil union," "domestic
partnership," "civil partnership," and "registered partnership" interchangeably. See genemlly
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predictng Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Marinage, 18 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 105, 110-13 (2010)




for instance, 146,030 PACSs were registered, as opposed to 265,404
marriages."
The story of the PACS provides insight about the development of
such legal change, the population that chooses to use it and their
reasons, and the societal and legal implications of the change. While
the PACS may have played a slight role in the decline in marriage
rates, demographic data show that the total number of registered
unions (that is, both marriages and PACSs) has increased. This growth
is "explained exclusively by the success of the PACS civil
partnership."" Hence, this alternative registration, in fact, encourages
unmarried couples, regardless of sexual orientation, to secure a better
arrangement for themselves. While the PACS serves as a permanent
alternative to marriage for some, it is a prelude to marriage for others,
as evidenced by the fact that one of the primary reasons for
termination of the PACSs is conversion to marriage." The French
experience also teaches that even if civil unions were originally
conceived mainly for same-sex couples, societal views of civil unions
are capable of changing dramatically.
While I recognize the deep differences between American law,
society, and culture and those of the French, I suggest that adopting an
RCR scheme is the functionally and politically optimal way to address
the limitations of current law in the United States. The United States
already has the necessary infrastructure: in the past two decades,
sixteen states have created alternative registration forms, and some of
them already make these alternatives available to opposite-sex
couples." But in order to be true alternatives, they need to be different
from marriage; at the same time, they cannot be culturally inferior to
marnage.
This Article is organized as follows. In Part II, I provide
demographic statistics and a brief description of recent changes to the
American family structure, followed by a more detailed survey of the
various groups of unmarried couples and their reasons for not getting
married. I suggest, in Part III, that the current legal system does not
provide adequate protection to nonmarital couples. Part IV contains a
survey of the current proposals for legal reforms-traditionalism,
10. France Prioux & Magali Mazuy, Recent Demogrphic Developments m France:
Tenth Anniversaiy of the PACS Civil Partnership, and over a Million Contracting Parties, 64
POPULATION 393, 408 & n.24 (2009).
11. France Prioux, Magali Mazuy & Magali Barbieri, Recent Demogmrphic
Developments in France: FewerAdults Live with a Partner, 65 POPULATION 363, 379 (20 10).
12. See id. at 376-77.
13. See discussion Adam Part III.B.
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abolition, functionalism, and the menu of alternatives-and in it I
examine the shortcomings of each of these approaches. In Part V I lay
out a proposal for the RCR in general terms. Subsequently, I explore
how the RCR promotes autonomy and gender equality as well as the
weaknesses of the proposal; namely, I ask whether it is a practical
proposal, whether the federal government would recognize such
unions, and whether this scheme would be of any value in the absence
of such federal recognition. Finally, I discuss the fact that Americans
tend not to introduce contracts into their relationships and to value
marriage for its cultural, religious, and historical significance. In Part
VI, I present the main lessons from the French approach, followed by a
brief conclusion.
II. DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE OF NONMARITAL
UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
In this Part, I give a brief overview of the statistics concerning
nonmarital unions in order to show how prevalent the phenomenon is
and how family structures have changed in past decades. I then
examine the subgroups of couples in nonmarital unions and their
different needs for legal recognition.
A. Changmg Family Structure
The United States, like other Western, first world countries, has
experienced dramatic changes in family structure since the 1970s.
Among these changes is the extraordinary rise in the number of
unmarried couples, which has been accompanied by a decline in the
number of marriages. 4
Before the 1970s, cohabitation was not just rare and regarded as
deviant, but was unlawful as a result of criminal sanctions against
cohabitation as well as widespread laws criminalizing fornication."
Since the 1970s, however, these laws have been challenged as
unconstitutional; some were struck down by state courts, some were
repealed by state legislatures, and some are simply no longer
enforced." The United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v
Texas may mean that anticohabitation laws are no longer
14. D'Vera Cohn et al., Barely Half of US. Adults Am Marnied-A Record Low,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-
half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-a-record-low/?src=prc-headline.
15. See, eg., CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 13-20 (2010).
16. Id at 15-18.
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constitutional,17 but sixteen states still have laws against cohabitation or
fornication, even if they are no longer enforced.'"
In 2009 and 2010, for the first time since the United States
Census Bureau started to collect census information a hundred years
ago, the number of adults between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-
four who were never married surpassed the number of married
individuals." The 2010 Census reported that, for the first time in
history, married couples constituted fewer than one-half of all
American households.20 The 2011 Current Population Survey found
that 7.6 million opposite-sex couples live in nonmarital arrangements.2'
As this option has become more popular, attitudes toward cohabitation,
once negative, have changed tremendously, especially among youths. 2
Indeed, a 2010 survey found that nearly four in ten Americans say
marriage is becoming obsolete. 23  While cohabitation was originally
mostly popular among the less educated and less economically
privileged, the practice has expanded to other segments of the
population; 24 today, approximately 19% of cohabitating males in
17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas's antisodomy provision as
unconstitutional).
18. See, eg, MIss. CODE § 97-29-1 (2012). Of course, the fact that the laws are not
enforced does not make their existence insignificant, as they may still be used as weapons in
custody battles and may make it more difficult to fight against discriminatory policies. See
BOwMAN, supa note 15, at 20.
19. Mark Mather & Diana Lavery, lIn US., Proportion Mamried at Lowest Recorded
Levels, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 2010), http://www.prb.org/Articles/2010/
usmarriagedecline.aspx.
20. Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority Census Fnds,
N.Y TIMES (May 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26marry.html.
21. More Young Adults Are Living in Their Parents'Home, Census Bureau Reports,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
families households/cb 11-1 83.html.
22. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead & David Popenoe, Who Wants To Mary a Soul Mate?
New Survey Findings on YoungAdults'Attitudes About Love and Marriage, in THE STATE OF
OUR UNIONS 2001: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 6, 10 (2001), http://www.
stateofourunions.org/pdfs/SOOU2001 .pdf (indicating that 43% of respondents to a national
survey of 1003 young adults aged 20 to 29 answered that they believe cohabitating couples
should receive government benefits); David Popenoe, Cohabitation, Marriage, and Child
Wellbeing: A Cross-National Perspective, 46 SoC'Y 429, 429-30 (2009) ("In the past 25
years, the percentage of high school seniors who 'agreed' or 'mostly agreed' with the
statement 'It is usually a good idea for a couple to live together before getting married in
order to find out whether they really get along' has climbed from 45% to 64% for boys and
32% to 57% for girls.").
23. The Decline of Mamiage and Rise of New Families, PEW RESEARCH SOC. &
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-
decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/6/.
24. Steffen Reinhold, Reassessing the Link Between Premarital Cohabitation and
MaritallJnstability, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 719, 719 (2010).
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opposite-sex relationships earn more than $50,000 a year.25 More than
10% of female cohabitants in opposite-sex relationships earn more
than $50,000 a year, and more than 20% of them hold a bachelor's
degree or have achieved a higher level of education.26
B. Who Are They and Why Don't They Get Maried?
In order to craft a law that responds to the reality of current
family structures and to assess the suitability of the current legal
regime, we must know the population whose interests are at stake and
what its legal needs are. Who, then, are the people who live in
nonmarital unions in the United States? It is important, first, to
emphasize that cohabitation is a heterogeneous practice, existing
among different ethnic groups, cultures, age groups, and
socioeconomic classes (and different from one individual to another),
and that the reasons for it vary. Obviously, there are intersections
among these characteristics-that is, some people belong to more than
one group.2 An overview of the body of knowledge on this subject,
which has been collected by social scientists and demographers,
exceeds the scope of this Article. For the purposes of this Article, it is
sufficient to briefly introduce the main groups of people in nonmarital
unions.28
Generally, people who cohabitate in the United States do so for a
relatively short period of time; more than 50% of such unions last only
two years on average, after which the couples marry or separate."
Although one-half of first-time cohabitants expect to marry within
three years,30 40% end their relationships within five years of moving
25. Amcicak Families and Living Arrangements: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
tbl.UC3 (Nov. 2011), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps20l1.
html.
26. Id
27. Julie A. Phillips & Megan M. Sweeney, Premarital Cohabitation and Marital
Disruption Among White, Black, and Mexican American Women, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
296, 297 (2005).
28. For an excellent and extensive review and analysis of cohabitation in the United
States, see BOWMAN, supm note 15, at 125-69.
29. Sheela Kennedy & Larry Bunpass, Cohabitation and Childrnfa Living
Arangements: New Estimates from the United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC REs. 1663, 1673
(2008).
30. PAULA Y GOoDwIN, WILLIAM D. MOSHER & ANJANI CHANDRA, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 2010-1980, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL




in together and without getting married.3  Roughly 10% stay together
as unmarried couples for more than five years. Despite the short
duration of these relationships, around 50% of cohabiting couples pool
their incomes to some extent." Many cohabitants raise children
together, and in 2008, almost 4.2 million children lived in households
headed by unmarried, opposite-sex couples.34
The largest group of unmarried couples is comprised of those in
premarital cohabitation arrangements: couples who live together with
the intention of getting married and want to examine their relationship
before doing so.3 Today in the United States, cohabitation precedes
over two-thirds of all first marriages,3 and one-half of women between
the ages of fifteen and forty-four who have ever been married
cohabitated at some point before marrying."
The second largest group of cohabiting couples in the United
States is divorced people." In 2007, more than one-fourth of
cohabiting couples were both previously married, and in about one-
half of cohabiting couples one partner was divorced.3 1 Within this
group, the reasons for cohabitation are clear: many are wary of
marriage after experiencing an acrimonious divorce and would like to
do a better job of screening their new partners.40
Another prominent group of cohabiting couples in the United
States is older adults. Based on the 2000 Census, it has been estimated
31. Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research
Themes, Fndigs, andImplications, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 1, 3 (2000).
3 2. Id.
33. BOWMAN, supm note 15, at 138-39.
34. Id at 159. This Article does not offer a sustained examination of child-rearing,
nor its correlation to adults' reasons to get married or to organize their lives in other ways
(contract or alternative registration). This is not because children's or their caretakers' needs
are less important. Rather, when it comes to legal issues related to children that stem from
their parents' status-like parental presumptions, I am in favor of functional family law that
provides these rights and protections equally, regardless of the parents' status. In addition, a
large part of the population that would be presumed to use RCRs are people in premarital
relationships, elderly, and friends without mutual children. Issues relating to children are of
less interest to some people in this population.
35. E.g., GOODWIN, MOSHER & CHANDRA, supra note 30, at 2.
36. Daniel T. Lichter, Richard N. Turner & Sharon Sassler, NationalEstimates ofthe
Rise h Seial Cohabitation, 39 Soc. Sci. RES. 754, 755 (2010).
37. Anita Jose, K. Daniel O'Leary & Anne Moyer, Does Premarital Cohabitation
Pdict Subsequent Maital Stability and Marital Quality? A Meta-Analysis, 72 J. MARRIAGE
& FiM. 105,106 (2010).
38. See Xiaohe Xu, Clark D. Hudspeth & John P. Bartkowski, The Role of
Cohabitation hi Remariage, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 261, 261 (2006) ("[P]ostdivorce
cohabitation is even more common than premarital cohabitation.").




that more than one million cohabitants are over fifty years old." Many
of the people who belong to this group are divorced or have been
widowed. The motivations for cohabitation among older adults and
the nature of these relationships are different from those of younger
cohabitants.42 For example, some older cohabitants may have
economic incentives not to marry, such as a loss of spousal support or
a reduction of Social Security benefits.43 Others may feel pressure not
to marry from their children, who wish to protect their inheritance."
Some female cohabitants desire companionship, but prefer to avoid the
gender roles attendant to many marriages." Research shows that while
older cohabitants generally do not plan to marry, the quality of their
relationships is better than those of younger cohabitants." The
prevalence of older cohabitants and their special needs have led a few
states to offer domestic partnership schemes for opposite-sex, older
couples (but not for younger opposite-sex couples).47
One more way to characterize cohabitation patterns is by racial or
ethnic group. While African-Americans, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic
whites are equally likely to enter into cohabitation, African-Americans
are far less likely than non-Hispanic whites to eventually marry, and
Hispanics fall somewhere in the middle.48 The reasons proffered as to
why African-Americans do not move on to marriage vary. Some
scholars think that African-Americans use cohabitation as an
alternative to marriage, rather than as a bridge-an argument that is
supported by the higher number of nonmarried African-Americans
who have children." Other accounts indicate that African-Americans
are less likely to marry because African-American females worry
41. Susan L. Brown, Gary R. Lee & Jennifer Roebuck Bulanda, Cohabitation Among
OlderAdults: A NationalPortmai 61B J. GERONTOLOGY S71, S71 (2006).
42. Id. at S72.
43. BOWMAN, supra note 15, at 119. While some older cohabitants do not marry
because they are afraid that their alimony will be terminated, the fact is that in many states
cohabitation is also a cause for terminating the alimony. The termination-cohabitation policy
has different structures in different states. Some states adopted a rebuttable presumption that
cohabitation causes a financial change that justifies termination or modification of alimony.
Other states have taken another approach: they demand proof of change in a woman's needs
and financial situation due to cohabitation. See, eg., J. Thomas Oldham, Cohabitation by an
AhmonyReciolentRevisited 20 J. FAM. L. 615, 621-23 (1981-82).
44. Brown, Lee & Bulanda, supm note 41, at S72.
45. Id.
46. BowMAN, supmnote 15, at 120.
47. See discussion krnfa Part III.B.
48. GooDwiN, MOSHER& CHANDRA, supra note 30, at 2.
49. Phillips & Sweeney, supra note 27, at 298.
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about their partners' inability to support them financially.5 ' Ralph
Richard Banks recently published a controversial book in which he
argues that the shortage of eligible African-American men (due to high
incarceration rates) and the educational gap between male and female
African-Americans, along with African-American women's reluctance
to marry outside their race (which African-American men do more
often), are the main causes for the decline in marriage among African-
Americans."
An additional factor bearing on the decision to cohabit is the
couple's financial situation. It is well established by quantitative and
qualitative research that many poor and working-class Americans
believe they need to attain financial security before getting married,
thus they tend to delay marriage.52 Indeed, the poor are far less likely
to ever get married than are people in the middle class." The decision
to wait until they have achieved financial security often stems from
their desire to purchase a home prior to marriage. Some of these
couples do not get married because they do not have the money for a
"real" wedding ceremony, as opposed to a ceremony at a city hall.54
Indeed, historically during periods of economic instability the number
of weddings performed significantly decreases; this was also true
during the recent financial crisis."
Finally, an unknown number of unmarried couples are
"ideological cohabitants." This group consists of people who view
cohabitation as a permanent way of life, a legitimate alternative to
marriage, and not just a temporary condition or a prelude to marriage."
Their reasons vary: some do it out of opposition to marriage as a
50. BOWMAN, supra note 15, at 111-13.
51. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, Is MARRIAGE FOR WITE PEOPLE? How THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011) (illustrating the
influence of race on cohabitation and marriage practices among the African-American
population).
52. Kathryn Edin, Maria J. Kefalas & Joanna M. Reed, A Peek Inside the Black Box:
What Marnage Means for Poor Unmarned Parents, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1012
(2004); Pamela J. Smock, Wendy D. Manning & Meredith Porter, "EverytIngk There Except
Money"- How Money Shapes Decisions To MarTy Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 680, 684 (2005).
53. NAOMI CHAN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 3 (2010).
54. Smock, Manning & Porter, supra note 52, at 688-93.
55. Erik Eckholm, Saying No to "I Do," with the Economy i Mid N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/us/29marriage.html; see BOWMAN,
supm note 15, at 100.
56. KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE
AND LAW 104-07 (2006).
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patriarchal institution," while others "desire ... freedom and choice in
their intimate lives, as opposed to the compulsion and constraint they
believe typify marriage relationships."'
Other types of families exist in which marriage does not play a
role. Same-sex couples cannot get married in most states in the United
States; thus, some cohabit because they are denied the option of
marriage. Some people just fall into cohabitation; that is, they move in
together and then continue living as partners, feeling that it would be
too much trouble to get married or that they essentially are married
already. Relatives and friends may live together in a family setting and
function as a family or as caregivers for various reasons. I discuss the
way that friends and relatives function as caregivers further in Part
VB.2.a, below.
The legal needs of these groups vary. In some cases, people in
premarital cohabitations are less economically dependent on one
another and may still prefer that some of the rights traditionally
reserved for their spouse (like end-of-life decisions) will be claimed by
their parents. At the same time, the period of cohabitation outside of
marriage is becoming longer and, with it, the needs of partners are
greater during this period. These needs could include health insurance,
hospital visitations, medical leave, and citizenship status. Thus, the
couples in this group need a legal institution that recognizes their
relationships but does not confer full marital benefits and obligations
because they may not be ready for, or may not want, marital
commitment. The divorced and older cohabitants need legal
recognition of their relationships by the state and other third parties
(for example, so they can make medical decisions for one another) but
should be able to mediate their obligations to each other with
minimum state intervention (for example, so they can avoid financial
conflicts between their children and their surviving partner or avoid ex
post lawsuits for distribution of property and alimony).59 The question
of African-American marital choice exceeds the scope of this Article,
but for now it suffices to say that at least one scholar, Robin Lenhardt,
suggests that "any effort to determine the proper place of marriage in
the black community should not only consider marriage and the whys
of black America's current relationship to it, but also the increasing
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id. at 106.
59. For the older cohabitants, legal recognition of relationships is a double-edged
sword because some of them prefer not to be recognized so that they will not lose Social
Security. For them, legal recognition may not be useful.
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array of alternatives to marriage available""O Thus implying that an
improved version of civil union or domestic partnership could become
more attractive to African-Americans.
People who are poor need an institution that helps them negotiate
their rights and obligations as they wait for the day they will have the
financial security to wed. They could also use an institution that
involves less symbolism in its solemnization and that is easy and
inexpensive to participate in before they can afford to marry.
Ideological cohabitants need an alternative to marriage that is secular,
flexible, and lacks the historical and cultural connotations of marriage.
Friends and relatives who wish to receive some rights that stem from
their relationships may need a way to establish and secure these rights,
but in the most flexible way. They may not need alimony and
property-division rights but would benefit from the extension of one
partner's health care benefits (rather than separate health care plans),
the right to make medical decisions without power of attorney, and
possibly exemption from estate taxes.
Many individuals from these groups-and others-do not have
access to these rights today in the United States. In the following
discussion, I briefly survey the current state of legal recognition of
nonmarital unions in the United States. I will demonstrate that
unmarried couples-regardless of their reasons for not getting
married-lack the flexibility, security, and certainty in organizing the
legal consequences that stem from their relationships.
III. LACK OF LEGAL RIGHTS FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES
Legal recognition of partnerships can be critical at several
occasions in a couple's life together. For example, upon dissolution of
the relationship or the death of one of the partners, the rights of each
partner concerning property division and the financial obligations of
the partners to each other are of great importance. While marital
property rules are founded on the principles of equal or just division of
property upon dissolution and the obligation for spousal maintenance"
(unless they contract otherwise), unmarried partners are not
60. Robin A. Lenhardt, Race and the Place of Marriage (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
61. The rules of both division of property and support differ from state to state. See
Shahar Lifshitz, Mamed Agaist Their Will? Toward a Pluraist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1565, 1608-09 (2009).
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automatically entitled to the protection of these rules." Lack of legal
recognition also means denial of many benefits and rights that are
bestowed by the state and granted by other third parties to a married
couple during their relationship, ranging from tax exemptions to
hospital visitation rights, immigration rights, parental presumption,
and extension of health benefits." In this Part, I first describe the
absence of defined obligations of unmarried partners vis-A-vis each
other, and the shortcomings of ex post judicial determinations of the
nature of partners' obligations. Subsequently, I examine the state's
failure to extend rights and benefits to unmarried couples and why
domestic partnerships and civil unions as currently designed do not
solve this problem.
A. Inadequacy ofNonmgisteaedMechaisms
This Subpart introduces three types of mechanisms to establish or
enforce rights between unmarried couples without registration:
contract-based rights, equitable remedies, and status-based rights.
1. Contract-Based Rights
Unmarried couples can sometimes establish their obligations to
each other by contract. This involves a variety of difficulties, however.
Before 1976, contracts concerning financial arrangements between
unmarried couples were unenforceable.' Today, most states follow the
California model, as defined by the famous case of Marvia v Marvil,
in which the Supreme Court of California ruled that the fact that a
cohabiting man and woman were not married did not in itself
invalidate agreements between them related to their earnings, property,
and expenses. Only Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana do
not recognize cohabitants' right to contract regarding their rights and
responsibilities toward each other.66 However, states differ with regard
62. See, eg., Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1981) (affirming the
denial of palimony or alimony to a woman who lived with her partner for five years); Arwood
v. Sloan, 560 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (denying the claim of a male cohabitant
to rights in his deceased partner's estate).
63. See, eg., Elizabeth F Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marnage and
Countermarnage, 99 CAiF. L. REV. 235, 258-59 (2011).
64. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United
States, 26 L. & Pol'Y 119, 126 (2004).
65. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
66. Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475, 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial
court did not err in dismissing appellants claim of implied contract based on her agreement
with her partner to provide sexual relations in exchange for monetary support because the
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to what makes such a contract valid. While the Marvzn court explicitly
approved the recognition of an implied contract between the couple,
based on their behavior," other states recognize only express
contracts." Similarly, some states enforce oral contracts between
cohabitants, while others demand the existence of a written contract.
Even in the states that have adopted the rule associated with
Marvmn, in most, contract theory does not provide a just and adequate
outcome for the party in need. The problem stems from the fact that
most unmarried couples simply do not draw up contracts,o and even in
states that recognize implied or oral contracts, it is very difficult to
prove such a contract exists." Moreover, even if one party succeeds in
proving that there was a contract, the terms of the contract can still be
disputed and are ultimately decided by a court or jury, which may be
biased against cohabitants and is often limited in its ability to discern
the partners' expectations.72 Litigation can be extremely unpleasant
and intrusive to both parties because, as with all contracts, the parties
must prove formation and valid consideration; to do so, it is often
necessary to reveal intimate details pertaining to the couple's private
state does not enforce contracts based on immoral consideration and "unmarried cohabitation
would constitute immoral consideration" (citation omitted)); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1207, 1211 (111. 1979) (holding that "unmarried cohabitants' mutual property rights ...
cannot appropriately be characterized solely in terms of contract law" and that to hold
otherwise would violate public policy); Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 322
(La. App. 5 Cir. 1983) ("Even if the alleged agreement was not required to be in writing, it
would be unenforceable because it is a meretricious one."); Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931,
932, 936 (Miss. 1994) (holding that a woman who had cohabited with a man for several years
was not entitled to "equitable division of partnership assets" from her husband because the
Mississippi legislature "has not extended the rights enjoyed by married people to those who
choose merely to cohabit").
67. Marvin, 557 P2d at 121-22.
68. See Bowman, supm note 64, at 126 ("[O]ther states moved to accept Marvin but
to limit its application. New York, for example, restricted Marvin rights to those based on
express contracts .... Minnesota and Texas went further, passing Statutes of Frauds that
require cohabitants' contracts to be in writing." (citations omitted)); Ann Laquer Estin,
Ordnary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381, 1396-97 (2001).
69. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supr note 15, at 47-48; MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2012);
Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y 1980) (holding that a contract to share earnings
and assets cannot be inferred simply from a cohabiting couple's relationship).
70. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, LegalPlanning
for Untnaried Comrtted Partners: Empircal Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic
Approach, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 417 (1999) (presenting a study of Minnesota residents that found
that only 29% of unmarried couples had a written contract regarding property).
71. BOWMAN, supra note 15, at 51.
72. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marnage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 256-57.
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life." Such contracts can be undesirable for other reasons as well-
among them, the prohibitive cost of this kind of litigation and the fact
that any system that rests on the premises of ex post determination of
obligations between partners inevitably promotes uncertainty. 4
2. Equitable Remedies
Likewise, equitable remedies do not provide an adequate
solution. Many courts in the United States recognize claims between
cohabitants for restitution under the legal theories of unjust
enrichment, resulting trust, constructive trust, quantum merit and
contract implied by law." The most common use of equitable relief is
when both cohabitants contribute to the purchase of a common
residence in a separate property jurisdiction (for example, each paying
a portion of the mortgage or everyday expenses), but the property is
listed under the name of only one of the parties; upon death or
separation, the other party finds themself without any rights in the
property." In another common scenario, the woman in an opposite-sex
relationship has contributed to the home by providing domestic
services and taking care of the children but, upon separation or the
death of her partner, is left without any share in the property.
Equitable relief, however, is also an insufficient legal remedy.
Courts tend to award very small amounts for housekeeping" and
frequently provide equitable relief only in cases in which the plaintiff
contributed financially to the purchase of a particular asset (as opposed
to contributing work "that can be characterized as part of the ordinary
give-and-take of a shared life")." Because people do not normally
enter into cohabitation arrangements as a result of fraud, duress, or a
mistake and theoretically have an opportunity to negotiate what
services or support they will bring to the union, it is hard to satisfy the
73. Cf, e.g., Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("Thus it
appears to us that a cause of action based on an express contract. . . is enforceable ... as long
as it is clear there was valid, lawful consideration separate and apart from any express or
implied agreement, regarding sexual relations." (omission in original)).
74. See Scott, supm note 72, at 256-57.
75. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 167-68 (2004); see also
Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1989) (imposing a constructive trust in the
female cohabitant's favor on one half of the property); Mitchell v. Oksienik, 880 A.2d 1194,
1199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (finding that as "joint venturers," unmarried
cohabitants are "entitled to seek a partition of their property when their joint enterprise comes
to an end, irrespective of how the title was formally held").
76. BowMAN, supmanote 15, at 40.
77. Id. at 44.
78. See Estin, supm note 68, at 1400.
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legal requirements of the cause of action for unjust enrichment."
Legal commentators have therefore suggested that equitable claims are
not a suitable legal theory to govern the legal treatment of unmarried
couples."
3. Status-Based Rights
Washington State has developed a unique status-based approach
for resolving disputes between cohabiting couples upon separation.
The courts there have advanced the doctrine of "committed intimate
relationships" (previously known as "meretricious relationships") in
which the court looks at the couple's conduct during their relationship
to see if the relationship demonstrates a marriage-like pattern." If the
court finds that it does, the couple is treated similarly to married
couples with regard to property distribution, that is, their community
property is distributed between them in a just fashion. While in other
states couples are required to "opt in" (that is, to prove the existence of
a contract), in Washington cohabiting couples may need to "contract
out" (that is, to sign a contract if they want to avoid the presumption of
shared property upon separation)."
While Washington's legal theory provides more certainty for
unmarried couples, it still has serious disadvantages. First, ex-partners
are not eligible for spousal support." Second, in order for the
committed intimate relationships doctrine to apply, the relationship
must be marital-like: stable, continuous, and involving the sharing of
resources.' Relationships that do not fit this pattern-for example,
because the couple has lived together on and off-will fall short of
recognition." Moreover, as is often the case in establishing the rights
of unmarried couples, the judicial inquiry inevitably involves an
79. See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants,
77 U. CoLO. L. REv. 711, 736 (2006).
80. See Robert C. Casad, Unmarned Couples and Unjust Enichrnent: From Status
to Contract and Back Again 77 MICH. L. REV 47 (1978); Sherwin, supra note 79, at 736.
But see DAGAN, supra note 75, at 167 ("While restitution is downplayed by the literature on
cohabitation, it is, in fact, an important source of recovery between cohabitants absent an
explicit contractual arrangement." (footnote omitted)).
81. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (ruling that in
dividing property acquired by the unmarried couple, the court must examine the meretricious
relationship and the property accumulations, and it make a just and equitable disposition of
the property); see Olver v. Fowler, 168 P3d 348, 350 (Wash. 2007) (establishing the term
"law of committed intimate relationships").
82. BowMAN, supra note 15, at 56.
83. Id. at 58.




"intrusive examination into factors that qualify a relationship as
'marital-like""' and can also be a financial burden.
The remedies discussed in Part III.A can be used to define and
enforce obligations between the partners themselves, but do not make
unmarried couples eligible for the rights and benefits that the state
bestows on married couples or for those granted by third parties. In
Part lIE.B, I examine the legal recognition of unmarried couples in the
few states that provide registration schemes.
B. Inadequacy ofDomesdc Partnerships and Civil Unions
A few states allow opposite-sex couples to register as domestic or
civil partners." These registrations vary widely in their requirements
for eligibility and in the scope of rights and benefits that they offer.
Illinois," Nevada," Hawaii,' and the District of Columbia!' allow
opposite-sex couples to register in civil unions or in domestic
partnerships and receive more or less of the rights and benefits that the
state bestows upon married couples. The problem, however, is that in
most cases these statutes differ only in name from marriage, so there is
very little incentive for couples to use them rather than simply marry
(aside from the desire to avoid the term "marriage" and its negative
historical heritage92 ). In addition, it is unclear whether opposite-sex
couples who register as civil or domestic partners receive the rights
granted to married couples by the federal government."
Washington and California also have domestic partnership laws,
and these are not just "marriage mimic status," all-or-nothing laws.'
This type of registration is only open to opposite-sex couples when at
8 6. Id.
87. A few other states (for example, Delaware and New Jersey) have civil union or
domestic partnership arrangements that are restricted to same-sex couples. DEL. CODE tit. 13,
§ 202 (2012); N.J. STAT. § 37:1-30 (2012).
88. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/5 (2012).
89. NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 122A.010-.200 (2012).
90. S. 232, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. (Haw. 2001) (listing the requirements for entering
into a civil union).
91. D.C. CODE § 32-701 (2012).
92. Cf Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marniage, 41 FAv. L.Q. 537, 551-54
(2007) (envisioning a world in which civil unions replace marriage and contemplating the
advantages of civil unions over marriage).
93. See supra Part VC.2.
94. The term "marriage mimic status" is taken from Nan Hunter, DC Should Not





least one of the partners is over the age of sixty-two." The terms of
New Jersey's domestic partnership are even more limiting. To qualify,
both partners must be sixty-two or older." The couple must also share
a common residence, and they need to show that they are jointly
responsible for their common welfare, as evidenced by joint financial
arrangements or joint ownership of real or personal property.9 7
Furthermore, domestic partners who wish to terminate their
relationship must go through a judicial dissolution process similar to
divorce." In light of these limitations, it is not surprising that
registration for domestic partnership in New Jersey has not been a
great success: in 2008, for example, only thirty-two couples
registered."
Other states provide more sophisticated alternatives, but they also
have their share of problems. Maine has a domestic partnership law
that both opposite- and same-sex couples can take advantage of, but
couples are required to live together for a year before they are able to
register.'o The advantage of this law is that it offers an easy exit: the
partnership is automatically terminated if one party gets married, if
both parties file a declaration of mutual consent, or if one party serves
notice to the other according to the state's guidelines.'
Vermont and Hawaii have a "reciprocal beneficiaries"
registration-a type of registered partnership that is available to a
limited group of people.0 2 In Hawaii, the registration is open only to
people who are "prohibited from marrying one another""0 and in
Vermont, individuals who wish to take advantage of the registration
must "be related by blood or adoption to the other party."" These
statutes are thus very limited in their scope and do not provide
alternatives for opposite-sex couples in conjugal relationships, nor, in
95. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (2011) ("[P]ersons of opposite sexes may not
constitute a domestic partnership unless one or both of the persons are over the age of 62.");
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.030 (2012).
96. N.J. STAT. § 26:8A-4 (2012).
97. Id. § 26:8A-4(b)(1)-(2).
98. Id. § 26:8A-10.
99. BOwMAN, supm note 15, at 67-68 n.82 (citing statistics provided by the New
Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, which Bowman has on file).
100. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 2710(2B) (2012) ("The domestic partners have been
legally domiciled together in this State for at least 12 months preceding the filing.").
101. Id.
102. SeeHAw. REy STAT. § 572C-3 (2012).
103. Id. § 572C-4(3).





Vermont, do they provide such alternatives for nonintimate partners. It
is no wonder, then, that the number of registrations is extremely
small.'o
The most unique and flexible model for legal recognition of
couples in nonmarital relationships is Colorado's "designated
beneficiary" law.' This statute allows couples to register as
designated beneficiaries, which involves an agreement ensuring
certain rights and financial responsibilities. To this effect, couples file
a state-provided form with the county clerk and recorder's office. The
status is open to both opposite- and same-sex couples. It offers the
options of a joint ownership regime, hospital visitation rights, medical
decision-making rights, health and life insurance benefits, and the
ability to sue for wrongful death. By checking specific boxes on a
simple form, the couple decides which of the listed rights and
obligations it will commit to."' However, despite its innovative nature
and flexibility, the Colorado law is not without problems. The
designated beneficiaries cannot file a joint tax return, and insurance
companies are not obligated to recognize named beneficiaries. In
addition, the law does not deal with issues of spousal support.
Moreover, while it is for the good of the partners that they may easily
change some parts of the agreement, because legal documents that are
valid and enforceable trump the designated beneficiary agreement,'"
there is a risk that such a regime does not provide protection against
intentional or unintentional disinheritance (because one partner can
simply amend their will without notifying their registered partner).
In summary, despite their potential as alternatives to marriage,
current, status-based registrations in the United States are very limited
and often serve as fig leaves for the denial of marriage for same-sex
couples. That is, they are often either marriage-by-a-different-name or
have prerequisites not required by marriage, like common residency.
Additionally, the fact that they are inherently a compromise intended to
block the legalization of same-sex marriage, rather than an alternative
105. M.V LEE BADGETr, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 172 (2009) (stating that in Vermont, no one had
registered as reciprocal beneficiaries seven years after the law was passed and that probably
only same-sex couples registered in Hawaii).
106. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (2012); see Nancy Polikoff, The
Extraordinary New Colomdo Law, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE BLOG (Apr. 15,
2009), http/beyondstraightandgaymanage.blogspotcom/2009/04/extraodinary-new-colormdo-law.html
(praising Colorado's designated beneficiary law).
107. COLO.REv. STAT. § 15-22-106.
108. Id. § 15-22-103(3).
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to marriage for people regardless of their sexual orientation, makes
them socially and culturally inferior.'
The changes in family structure and the debate about how family
law should respond to these changes have prompted scholars to seek
the best ways to resolve the associated issues. In the next Part, I
survey proposals for policies and regulations and point out their pros
and cons.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGAL REFORM AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
The sweeping changes to family structures in the United States
have stimulated debate about how to craft desirable public policy and
have led to an upsurge of scholarly writing on the best options for the
legal recognition of families. Many scholars have explored the
limitations of current marriage law and suggested reforms; in my view,
each of their approaches has some shortcomings. Building on Edward
Stein's categories, I divide the legal literature on public policy
regarding partnership regulation into four groups of approaches:
traditionalist, abolitionist, menu-of-options, and functionalist."'
A. Taditionalism
Traditionalists contend that the state should encourage people to
procreate "responsibly"-meaning that they procreate in a way that
leads to a stable family structure, which traditionalists believe can only
be done by married, opposite-sex couples. Because of its clear
recognition of the father and mother as responsible for the child and as
providing the best environment for the child, marriage is seen as the
best framework in which couples can reproduce and care for their
children.'' Thus, traditionalists advocate preserving the special status
of marriage."2
Traditionalists base much of their arguments on social science
research. They insist that children who live in households headed by
109. Cf Mary Anne Case, Marnage Licenses, 89 Mumm. L. REv. 1758, 1775 (2005).
110. Stein, suprm note 5.
Ill. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and SocialInstitutions: WhyandHow
Should the Law Support Marniage? 18 NoTRE DiE J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 225, 233
(2004); Christina Davis, Comment, Domestic Partnerhips: What the United States Should
Learn from Fance k Experience, 24 PENN ST. Iwr'L L. REv. 683, 699-700 (2006).
112. Eg., Lynn D. Wardle, 'Multiply and Replenish"- Considenag Same-Sex
Maringe in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 771
(2001) (arguing that the special status of marriage needs to be preserved because it promotes




married couples enjoy a higher standard of living and better economic
conditions than children in alternative families who, some studies find,
are more likely to suffer from health and emotional problems, abuse,
and the like.'13  They aver that the high rate of poverty among
nontraditional families, the negative financial consequences of divorce,
and the birth of children to unmarried parents all pose a threat to the
social fabric. Traditionalists therefore advocate against the expansion
of rights to cohabiting couples; the denial of rights is believed to
incentivize at least some people to marry."" They also claim that
marriage, with its default rules and social understanding, is the best
framework for understanding couples' roles and obligations, whereas
other family forms are confusing."' In contrast: "The alternatives to
marriage create a plethora of choices and uncertainties. The
understandings, roles, and duties that attend the myriad liaisons short
of marriage are murky, confused, conflicting, and poorly defined.""'
However, the traditionalist approach is full of weaknesses. First,
there is no evidence that current social policy, which encourages
marriage over other forms of relationships, sufficiently decreases the
number of nonmarital unions. In fact, the opposite is the reality:
despite the limited rights offered to unmarried couples in the United
States, the number of nonmarital families is increasing."' The
argument that marriage offers a clear framework for couples is also
problematic; many people are not fully aware of what rights and
obligations are attached to marriage until they divorce."' Indeed, the
marriage default rules are different from state to state. (Not many
people know, for example, that in Georgia infidelity does not
113. Eg., Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marnage, 59
RUTGERS L. REv. 377, 386 (2007).
114. Cf Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Mariage: Inevitable or
Reversible?, 41 FM. L.Q. 491, 515-16, 520 (2007) (arguing that while initiatives designed to
promote formal marriage may have only limited results, they "may have the capacity to make
a difference at the margins").
115. Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine ofEquivalence, 107 MICH. L. REv. 999,
1010-12 (2009).
116. Id.at 1012.
117. BOwMAN, supra note 15, at 232.
118. I do not argue that marriage has no channeling effect. It is clear that many people
get married precisely because of the benefits that are attached to it and the lack of other
options. I do argue that the current policy that singles out marriage has failed to provide the
results that are expected, and while marriage is still affecting people's behavior, some of that
effect is to marginalize and deny rights to unmarried couples rather than incentivize them to
get married. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that welfare programs intended to
encourage people to get married do not affect people's behavior. Id at 233.
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necessitate the payment of maintenance.)"' People are, moreover,
unclear in general about what rights are conferred specifically by
marriage: some think that cohabitation in and of itself offers
partnership rights, despite the fact that common law marriage exists
only in a few jurisdictions,2 o while others regard their informal unions
as marriage.'21 Thus, the rights and benefits offered by marriage may
have a limited impact on some people's decisions concerning whether
or not to marry. Even if they did have such an impact, encouraging
people to marry who are not ready to do so would not yield the results
that traditionalists are expecting-and may even have adverse effects
on the couple.'22
Second, the data cited by traditionalists, as well as their
interpretation, are often disputable, simplistic, and generalized. While
social science research has demonstrated a variety of problems in the
lives of people in nonmarital unions, informal unions do not have
negative effects on all groups of unmarried couples. For example,
while the relationships of certain cohabitants are short lived, this is not
the case with all cohabitants, such as older cohabitants and Puerto
Ricans.'23 Similarly, an "informal relationship" does not mean that the
relationship is of a lesser quality for some subgroups; the quality of
relationships between older cohabitants, for instance, is better than that
of other subgroups. In fact, recent research-based on a study sample
from the National Survey of Families and Households of 2737 single
men and women, 896 of whom married or moved in with a partner
119. See Jennifer Levitz, The New Art ofAhmony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at Wi
(discussing the different attitudes evinced by various states' alimony laws); of NANCY D.
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW
179-80 (2008) ("Couples who marry have no idea what economic obligations accompany
their marriage .... The law is so different from state to state . . . .").
120. GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR
COHABITATION 8-12 (2008) (listing which jurisdictions recognize common law marriage).
121. BOWMAN, supr note 15, at 231-32. This is the case among some Puerto Ricans
who report their nonmarital unions as marriages. Interestingly, the Washigton Post recently
reported that in the 2010 Census-the first one in which respondents in same-sex
relationships could identify themselves as "wife" or "husband"--the number of individuals in
same-sex relationships who checked "husband" or "wife" was larger than the actual number
of same-sex couples in marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships. See Hope Yen,
Gay Couples Living Together Nearly Doubled in 10 Years, Census Shows, ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(Sept. 27, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/20110927
gay-marriages-census-numbers27-ON.html. The chief of the Fertility and Family Statistics
Branch of the Census Bureau explained that these couples "basically responded that way
because that is truly how they felt they were living." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See Garrison, supm note 114, at 516-17.
123. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of
Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 13-14 (2007).
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over the course of six years-found that the benefits of marriage over
long-term cohabitation are minor; regarding some factors-such as
happiness and self-esteem--cohabitants were doing better than
married couples.'24 Aile the research found that married couples
enjoy better health than cohabitants, the researchers hypothesize that
this is a result of the benefits attached to marriage, including health
insurance.'25 Likewise, it is unclear how much marriage itself-as
opposed to other factors related to the parents' education, environment,
financial conditions, and the like-actually affects children's well-
being. Indeed, "[r]esearchers have found it difficult to isolate marriage
from other factors that might explain differences in child welfare
within families."' In other words, it is not marital status that makes
one a good parent and produces happy children; rather, it is the quality
of parenting and other factors that determine whether or not a child
will fare well.1'
Third, even assuming that the traditionalists' claims and the
research that they cite are accurate, this does not mean that the right
policy would be one that denies rights to unmarried couples. The
opposite is true: if unmarried couples suffer from instability and
poverty, then the right policy would be one that provides support,
benefits, and property rights to couples both during and at the end of
the relationship, thus strengthening the emotional and economic well-
being of those involved. The denial of rights to unmarried couples
may, in fact, cause some of the adverse conditions from which they
suffer. For example, the result of not imposing obligations upon a
couple vis-d-vis each other is that the weaker partner is left without
property or financial support, which perpetuates poverty (in addition,
it is an incentive for the stronger party not to get married).28 Thus,
legal recognition and alleviation of the stigma that often accompanies
cohabitation may improve unmarried couples' socioeconomic
conditions and well-being.
124. Kelly Musick & Larry Bumpass, Reexamining the Case for Martiage: Union
Formation and Changes in Well-Beig, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1, 12-13 (2012).
125. Id. at 13.
126. Vivian E. Hamilton, Family Structure, Children, and Law, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
Pot'Y 9, 14 (2007).
127. Furthermore, research has consistently shown that the children of unmarried
same-sex couples fare as well as the children of married opposite-sex couples. See Erez
Aloni, Cloning and the LGBTI Family: Cautious Optimism, 35 NYU. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 46-47 (2011).




Some scholars support the abolition of marriage. A number of
people in this camp endorse a deregulation regime in which people
would organize their relationships through contracts.129 Others suggest
that the state should cease granting marriage licenses; rather, it should
offer only civil unions, and marriage should be solely a religious
institution.'
The proposals to abolish marriage also have many problems and
have been criticized from a variety of perspectives. Most importantly,
the abolition of marriage is not a practical option."' In addition,
because civil unions are similar to marriage in terms of their one-size-
fits-all approach to relationships, the adoption of civil unions in place
of marriage will not be enough to solve the problem of lack of
flexibility and choice for intimate partners and families living in
nontraditional arrangements."'
The idea of abolishing marriage raises other concerns as well. In
terms of efficiency, marriage has some advantages over solely
contractual regimes, including its recognition by third parties-
advantages that are hard to achieve through private contracts."' There
is also apprehension that couples would not enter into contracts
regarding the terms of nonmarital relationships; thus, in cases of
conflict within relationships, the default rules would apply in much the
same way they do under the current marriage-centered system.'34
129. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Deegulating Mariage: The Pro-Mamage Case
forAbolishing CivilMamnage, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 1161 (2006) (arguing that civil marriage
should be abolished in favor of marriage being solely a religious and cultural institution with
no legal definition or status); Clare Chambers, Feminism, Libemlism and Mamage,
http://www.brown.edu/Research/ppw/files/Feminism,%2OLiberalism%20and%20Marriage.d
oc (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
130. Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right To Mary. 98 CALIF. L. REv. 667, 695 (2010);
Alan M. Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, Government Should Quit the Mamniage Business,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/03/opinion/oe-dersh3.
13 1. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials ofMamage"' Reconsiderhig the Duty ofSupport
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 34 (2003) ("Despite such arguments in favor of the
abolition of marriage, such a step is, quite frankly, unlikely to occur, at least in the foreseeable
future."); Scott, supra note 92, at 547; Stein, supra note 5, at 371 ("I would reject abolition, at
least in the form of deregulation, as both impractical and theoretically problematic. I simply
do not think that the United States is ready now, or would likely be ready anytime soon, to get
rid of marriage.").
132. See Stein, supm note 5.
133. See, eg., Case, supra note 109, at 1781.
134. Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REv 1311, 1315
(2006). In addition, if some couples were to enter into the equivalent of prenuptial contracts,




C The Menu of Options
The menu-of-options approach promotes, in the words of Mary
Anne Case, "recognition of a variety of supportive family forms
offering persons of all sexes and orientations the opportunity to
structure their families and live their lives as best suits them."'35
William Eskridge predicts that the menu will look different from state
to state, and he cannot foresee what it will be comprised of in the
future.' Thus he envisions a "stylized list'" organized from the lowest
level of commitment to the highest as follows:'37
(1) domestic partnership: a partnership that will be recognized by
employers, and domestic partners will receive health insurance
and other benefits that are given by that employer;
(2) cohabitation: a relationship that demonstrates a greater level of
commitment and dependency between the partners, and thus the
state imposes duties of support on the couple;
(3) "cohabitation plus": an institution (like the PACS or Hawaii's
reciprocal beneficiary agreement) that allows for quick
dissolution, mutual support, and some "unitive rights," meaning
financial rights and other benefits (such as healthcare decision
making);'38
(4) civil unions: marriage-with-a-different-name;
(5) civil marriage;
(6) covenant marriage: traditional marriage, in which marrying
couples accept a different divorce process, including the need to
prove grounds for divorce and imposed waiting periods.'
This list, however, provides only a very broad and vague idea
about what each alternative includes and what function each serves.
For example, we do not know what kinds of rights would be given to
135. Case, supra note 109, at 1772.
136. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Libeml Vision of US. Family Law in 2020,
in THE CONSTTUTON IN 2020, at 245, 249-50 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
13 7. Id.
138. Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary relationship and the French PACS are very
different legal institutions. The reciprocal beneficiary relationship is limited only to couples
who cannot get married, such as same-sex couples and relatives, while the PACS is open to
opposite-sex couples but prohibited to relatives. The PACS offers many rights that the
reciprocal beneficiary relationship does not. For example, reciprocal beneficiaries cannot file
a joint state income tax return or obtain health insurance benefits. Importantly, the reciprocal
beneficiary relationship is not a contract like the PACS, so it is unclear what cohabitation plus
actually includes and why these two institutions represent this category.
139. Eg., ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2012); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 9:272, 275.1
(2012).
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informal cohabitants or how they would affect the function of the other
alternatives. Would cohabitation grant full marital rights and obliga-
tions, as in New Zealand, or a more limited bundle, as in France? We
do not know what kind of rights and obligations are included in
cohabitation plus or what population it is supposed to serve.
In addition, the list is long and complicated. Such a list inevitably
leads to confusion and in the end may be harmful to couples who do
not understand the differences between the various institutions and
would thus stick to the old and known option (marriage). Indeed, as
articulated by psychology professor Barry Schwartz: "[T]he fact that
some choice is good doesn't necessarily mean that more choice is
better.. .. [T]here is a cost to having an overload of choice."'40 What is
more, it is unclear why states need both cohabitation plus and civil
unions, or how civil unions are different from marriage. In the words
of Ian Curry-Sumner, a Dutch scholar, concerning the debate on the
necessity of civil unions in the Netherlands, "[C]hoice is all well and
good, so long as that choice is a real choice, rather than simply a
hollow shell."' 4'
In fact, the experience of other countries clearly teaches that civil
unions are only a burden on family law, and couples rarely choose
them as an alternative to other forms of regulation. With the exception
of France and Belgium, which I discuss in Part VI, registered
partnerships generally are not a popular option among opposite-sex
couples. Nor are they very popular among same-sex couples. For
example, in New Zealand, where same-sex marriage is not legal and
the institution of civil unions was brought into effect in 2005; by
December 2008, only 284 registrations out of 1506 were signed by
opposite-sex couples. 4 2 Notably, the number of registrations among
opposite-sex couples is very low compared with the more than 20,000
marriages celebrated annually.4 1 In the Netherlands, the statistical data
140. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 3 (2004).
141. Ian Curry-Sumner, The Netherlands: PartyAutonomyandResponsibility, in THE
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAw 255, 274 (Bill Atkin ed., 2008).
142. Marrnages, Civil Unions and Divorces: Year Ended December 2008, STAT. N.Z.
(May 5, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://www.stats.govt.nzlbrowsefor_stats/people-and_communi
ties/marriages-civil-unions-and-divorces/MarriagesCivilUnionsandDivorces HOTPYeDecO8.
aspx (data accessible by following "Marriages, Civil Unions and Divorces: Year ended
December 2008-Tables" hyperlink).
143. In 2008, 21,948 marriages were registered by New Zealand residents. See id. at
tbl.1.1. In 2009, 21,600 marriages were registered to New Zealand residents. Marnages,
Civil Unions, and Divorces: Year Ended December 2009, STAT. N.Z. (May 5, 2010, 10:45
AM), http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse-for stats/people and communities/marriages-civil-
unions-and-divorces/MarriagesCivilUnionsandDivorcesHOTPYeDecO9.aspx.
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is more complex but consistent: generally, only a small number of
opposite-sex couples choose registration over marriage or informal
cohabitation.'" In fact, in the Netherlands and in South Africa,
arguments are made for the repeal of registered partnerships because
they only make family law more complicated.'45 Most important, as I
suggest in the next Subpart, if a cohabitation plus scheme is flexible
enough, it can serve simultaneously as a civil union scheme.
D Functionalism
Still other academics suggest more complex partnership-
regulation regimes, including a functional family law that would
accommodate a wide range of families. In essence, the idea is that
how the relationship functions, rather than whether it is technically a
marriage, should determine the legal consequences of the union.
Generally, functional family law does not necessarily stand in
contradiction to the menu-of-options approach. In my view, some of
the proposals for functional family law could be characterized as part
of the menu of options: the part that governs couples in informal
relationships. Yet functional family law could stand in contradiction to
the menu of options if, de facto, it decreases the choices among well-
functioning options for legal recognition. A number of scholars have
144. BADGETr, supra note 105, at 61 (arguing that a small number of opposite-sex
couples choose registered partnership and that it is the fourth most popular option for them
after marriage, cohabitation with an agreement, and cohabitation without an agreement);
accordKatharina Boele-Woelki, Ian Curry-Sumner, Miranda Jansen & Wendy Schrama, The
Evaluation of Same-Sex Mamages and Registered Partneships in the Netherlands 8 YB.
PRIVATE INT'L L. 27, 33 (2006) ("Even though the absolute number of partnerships registered
each year is relatively small compared to the absolute number of marriages, it can still be
concluded that, of the couples who since 2001 have decided to formalize their relationship, a
small, but not insignificant group of people have chosen to register their partnership instead
of getting married. In this sense, registered partnership would seem to fulfill an apparent
demand from a small group of couples."). One could argue that I discount the situation in the
Netherlands because, despite the critique of civil unions and the relatively small number of
registrants, repeal has been repeatedly rejected. Ian Curry-Sumner, a Dutch legal scholar,
answers with a question: "Is Dutch law now better off having two formal relationship
institutions with more-or-less identical legal consequences? The answer is: it depends on
whom you ask!" Curry-Sumner, supra note 141, at 274.
145. See A.J.M. Nuytinck, Het geregistreerd partnerschap wordt niet afgescha.
Jamner een gemiste kans!, REPUB 2, http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/12197/Nuytinck,
%20Het%20geregistreerd%20partnerschap%20wordt%20niet%20afgeschaft.pdf (last visited
Jan. 29, 2013) (arguing that registered partnerships should be abolished to simplify the
legislation in the field of family law); B.S. Smith & J.A. Robinson, An Embarrassment of
Riches or a Profusion of Confusion? An Evaluation of the Continued Existence of the Civil
Union Act 17of2006in the Light ofProspective Domestic Partnerships Legislation in South
Afica, 13 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 30 (2010) ("[Tlhe Civil Union Act is an
unnecessary piece of legislation.").
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proposed such functionalist approaches, 14 6 and I will present two that
encompass much of the work on this subject.
Cynthia Grant Bowman suggests that couples who have
cohabited for more than two years or who have had a child (regardless
of how long they have been together) should be treated as married in
all respects of the law-vis-A-vis each other and by third parties,
including the state.'47 This quasimarital status would be imposed upon
them without their consent and would not require them to prove the
nature of their relationship.'48 Couples who do not want to be treated
as married would have an easy mechanism for opting out and could
contract about the terms of their relationships, if they wish to do so. In
cases where only one partner wants the obligations and commitment
offered by marriage, the process would provide the vulnerable side
(often the woman, in opposite-sex couples) with bargaining power.14
Finally, Bowman suggests a parallel system of domestic partnership in
which couples could register. The registration would allow the parties
to decide upon and outline their own obligations via contract, but the
default rules would be similar to marriage. The idea behind this option
is to allow couples, if they wish, to escape the religious connotations or
the gender-based assumptions associated with marriage."'
146. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AuToNOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2004) (arguing that the law should support dependent individuals and their
caretakers); Lifshitz, supm note 61 (arguing for a pluralist approach that divides unmarried
couples according to their presumed intentions and assigns them a bundle of rights upon
dissolution based on the categorization of their relationship); Scott, supm note 72 (arguing
that a contractual framework that presumes that cohabitants who live together for more than
five years intend to share property and to support each other financially upon dissolution).
For discussion of literature on legal recognition of friends and family members who are
entitled to some of the rights conferred by the state upon married couples, see hfim Part
VB.2.a.
147. BOWMAN, supm note 15, at 224-28. Bowman did not choose this period of time
randomly, but rather because most cohabitants do not live together for this long, so short-term
cohabitation would not be covered by the reform. In 2008, about 4.5 million individuals had
lived together longer than two years. Conversely, other countries use the three-year mark for
imposing marital status (for example, New Zealand), and other scholars, including the
American Law Institute (ALI), advocate for the three-year line for cohabitants without
children.
148. In this regard, Bowman's suggestion is different from that of the ALI, which has
proposed a similar system but one which would require proof by factors, such as
management of the household together. In addition, ALI's proposal only treats remedies
within dissolution and does not concern similar treatment by the state during the relationship,
as Bowman's proposal does. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONs §§ 4.09-.10, 5.04, 6.04-.06 (2002).
149. BOWMAN, supm note 15, at 228-29.
150. Id at 229-30.
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A more complex regulatory regime is proposed by Nancy
Polikoff, who advocates a major reform in the law's treatment of
family issues, a reform she characterizes as a "valuing-all-families"
approach."' This is a functional approach par excellence, according to
which there would be no bright-line rule (that is, not marriage nor any
other status) for the division of benefits and protections by the state.'
Instead, the law's protection of the familial unit would be motivated by
the purpose of the law at stake and the role the family members fulfill
in the family. For example, a partnership that involved children would
have rules of dissolution different from one that did not.'" Polikoff's
approach goes beyond recognition of intimate unions. In her view, the
law should recognize adult relationships; thus friendship and other
interdependent relationships are worthy of protection in the same way
that conjugal relationships are, according to the functions they fulfill.'54
Accordingly, her proposed legal system would look as follows:
marriage would be open to both opposite- and same-sex couples but
would be renamed "civil partnership." Regarding the regulation of
economic relationships between unmarried couples upon dissolution,
Polikoff's main point is that couples should not marry, register, or
contract in order to receive rights upon separation. She generally
supports the recommendations of the American Law Institute (ALI).
According to the ALI, couples who do not have children and who
cohabit for three years (or two years if they have children) are
presumed to be domestic partners and treated, for purposes of
dissolution of the relationship (but not for state rights during the
relationship), similarly to married couples in terms of property and
spousal support.'" The ALI proposes thirteen factors for establishing
151 POLlKOFF, supmnote 119, at 126.
152. Id.
153. Nancy Polikoff uses California's domestic partnership law as an example of
legislation that distinguishes between types of marriage for different purposes. For example,
the law allows some couples to divorce by filing a notice, with no need to go to court, when
they meet certain criteria (for instance, if the couple has been registered for less than five
years and has no children). Id. at 133.
154. Polikoff suggests that instead of relying upon marital status, the law should be
based on three principles: (1) "the needs of children and their caretakers" should be placed
"above the claims of able-bodied adult spouses/partners," (2) "the needs of children in all
family constellations" should be supported, and (3) adult interdependency must be
recognized. Id at 137-38.
155. ALI, supra note 148. While the ALl principles allow the legislature to decide the
length of the cohabitation period required to establish a "domestic partnership," the principles
seem to recommend, based on other countries' experience, that the cohabitation period should
be two years for couple with a common child and three years for a couple without a common
child. Id § 6.03 cmt. D. The principles also add factors that would rebut the presumption
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whether a couple should be treated as domestic partners. Among these
are whether the couple commingles finances, whether they name one
another as beneficiaries in documents (like wills), and whether they
present themselves to the community as a committed couple.
While these approaches are more promising than abolitionism
and traditionalism, and their rationales are compelling, they also have
some shortcomings. Polikoff's model seems entirely right, as there is
no good reason to single out marriage as the only worthy mechanism
to determine what constitutes a family. My only critique of Polikoff's
approach is that her model provides only one registration scheme for
couples.' In Polikoff's regulatory regime, intimate couples could only
enter into civil partnerships (equivalent to getting married) and would
not have any alternative registration options.'" In Bowman's model,
cohabiting couples would be afforded all the rights and obligations of
marriage only after two years-so there is very little incentive for them
to use the domestic partnership scheme she suggests, as it would not
add much more than the quasimarital status offers. Bowman's model
thus gives very little incentive for couples to register for any particular
marriage alternative and to design their relationship with maximum
flexibility; such a lack of incentive may, de facto, decrease choice.
What these proposals disregard is that registration, opt-in
schemes, and an ex ante establishment of a couple's rights, benefits,
and obligations have significant value.' They provide couples with a
created by the length of cohabitation. The same factors would be used to establish the
presumption when the cohabitation time was shorter than required by the statute.
156. Polikoff is also in favor of registration-not one intended to be used by conjugal
couples, but rather one that is for "those who lack a spouse/partner but wish to identify
someone considered a family member." This registration would affect only two areas of the
law: medical decision-making privileges and inheritance rights. The designated person
would have a right to make medical and disposition-of-remains decisions, and if the
designating person were to die without a will, the designated person would get the same share
of the estate that a spouse would receive. POLIKOFF, supm note 119, at 134.
157. One may wonder what the difference is between Polikoff's civil partnership and
the RCR. After all, if marriage becomes civil partnerships and the rules of exit change in
accordance with the couple's status (as in Polikoff's model), why then do we need both RCRs
and civil partnerships? First, because the idea of marriages becoming civil partnerships is not
realistic in the near future and an RCR-like regime already exists in Colorado, it seems that
the RCR is a more realistic option. Second, even assuming that marriages can transform into
civil partnerships, there will still be a place for marriage alternatives based on contract that
are less formal and more flexible than marriage or marriage with a different name.
158. My previous argument that couples rarely know the legal rules that are attached to
marriage does not stand in contradiction because there is a cultural understanding of what
marriage means, even if the legal institution's rules are not entirely clear. Unlike marriage, in




means of getting-with only one act of registration-the entire bundle
of rights, benefits, and obligations that stem from the relationship.
They exempt couples from the hassle of providing documentation and
other proof of the relationship to employers, judges, and
administrators.
Bowman's model is, in essence, a different path to marriage,
rather than an alternative. More important, the lack of registration in
her scheme creates significant difficulties in the relationships between
third parties (including the state) and the couple. If a couple wants, for
example, to enjoy tax benefits under Bowman's proposal, they would
not be eligible until they were able to show that they had lived together
for two years or had a child together. Would the couple have to prove
this at any time-or again and again-to the state and employers for
every different benefit they apply for? Of course, this issue could
easily be resolved if the couple were able to produce a certificate of
cohabitation (already a type of registration). Even then, what if a
couple raises a child together, who is the legal child of only one of the
partners? What happens if one relationship ends and a new one
begins; that is, how does the state know about the separation for
purposes of, say, taxation and Social Security? How would the
duration of the relationship be measured? What if only one partner is
named in the residency contract? What about couples who do not live
together (a growing trend in the United States and Europe)?'
In a regime where informal unions receive so many rights,
cohabitants have very little incentive to register. Therefore, under
these two proposals the range of choices concerning how to organize
the family in fact diminishes. In other words, these proposals are in
contradiction to a full and well-functioning menu of regulatory options
for relationship recognition.
Functional family law is a valuable idea: families should not be
denied any rights or benefits based on strict definitions of what
159. In addition, these proposals also put a heavy burden on, or even disregard, many
nontraditional couples. In New Zealand, the requirement that cohabiting couples must live
together in order to receive recognition is only one factor among others. This structure of the
law "means that there will be some cases where the parties do not actually live under the
same roof or where they spend only part of their time together." Bill Atkin, The Challenge of
Unmamed Cohabitation-The New Zealand Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303, 315 (2003). In
another place, Bowman argues that couples who live apart do not need to be recognized
under her model because the very fact that they maintain separate residences means that they
are not economically interdependent. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Family: Challenges
toAmerican Family Law, 22 CHILD FAM. L.Q. 387, 392-93 (2010). It seems likely that these
couples could use an alternative registration that would allow them to keep their economic
independence and still enjoy other rights that stem from their relationships.
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"family" is. At the same time, family law should be as clear and
efficient as possible. Functional family law is perhaps close to the
ideal. But the extra bureaucracy it entails could harm those who do
not have the means to consult lawyers or are unable to understand
complex rules." In this regard, it may be possible to formulate a more
flexible and simple family law that better serves people.
E Intermediate Summary: The Principles ofa Menu of Options
While this Article sides with the menu-of-alternatives approach,
it also argues that this is the least developed and most under-
investigated plan. This Article aims to set some initial principles for a
well-functioning menu-of-options system.
First, the list should offer relatively few choices in order to avoid
both confusion in family law and the promulgation of legally
unnecessary alternatives (such as marriage-mimic institutions).
Second, the list should not offer options that neutralize other options in
a way that, de facto, decreases choice. In other words, for a menu to
be successful, it is important to examine how the options interact with
each other. The options need to be tangential: they can touch the
boundaries of each other but cannot take over one another. Third, to
remedy problems that may arise from having a limited number of
alternatives, each institution should be as flexible as possible
(consistent with its unique purpose) in order to accommodate various
degrees of commitment and various types of relationships.
Still other questions remain open. What level of rights and
obligations would provide enough protection to informal couples while
leaving room for other alternatives? Does covenant marriage promote
the plurality of options, or does constraining the ability to seek divorce
infringe upon people's autonomy and private decision making?"'
160. One could argue that my proposal for the RCR is at least as complicated as
functional family law. While I am aware of, and discuss, the problems and complexities of
signing a contract, my regime is still less complicated and more accessible than other
functionalist models. As I discuss in the next Part, there will be some off-the-rack contracts
that are advertised or publicized in some way as well (like at a florist, where you can choose
each flower individually or you can choose a prepackaged bouquet). Moreover, as I explain
below, states can adopt the Colorado model that provides a standard form that contains a list
of numerous legal consequences from which to choose from. Second, the RCR is one
additional institution, even if it is a somewhat complicated one, and one that relies on the
advantages of status while the other proposals discussed here offer a set of different rules that
are established ad hoc or offer a complex of different rules about various aspects of couples'
lives.
161. See Lifshitz, supm note 61, at 1632-34 (arguing that covenant marriage is
consistent with a pluralistic approach). Even if one thinks that the option for covenant
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Should the menu of options include the recognition of polygamous
relationships?16 This Article leaves these questions for a future
discussion and focuses on the gap in the spectrum of legal
recognition-that space between informal relationships and marriage.
V. RCRs
In this Part, I propose that for a menu of options to be consistent
with the ideals of autonomy and gender equality it should include an
alternative to marriage in the form of the RCR. I start by outlining
what such a mechanism would look like. I then explore how this
model is consistent with the purposes of American family law. This is
followed by an assessment of its possible weaknesses.
A. Mechanism
The RCR's main purpose is to add an additional institution to the
menu of legally sanctioned relationship options-creating a menu that
recognizes the fact that families are no longer structured by the
dichotomist distinction of "married versus unmarried." RCRs would
serve those relationships that fall in the large space between marriage
and informal relationships. In practice, this means that RCRs should
accommodate diverse groups of couples with different levels of
commitment and varied legal needs. As such, it is not enough that the
RCR adds an additional option to the list of choices; it has to be highly
flexible within its own framework. The RCR should be an institution
that is different from marriage because marriage, with its one-size-fits-
all nature and its historical and cultural values, is not a relevant option
for various individuals; it should also be different from informal
relationships in that it should offer the benefits of registration and
recognition by the state and third parties.
Based on these principles, the most important aspects of the RCR
scheme are that it is a form of registration lacking a solemnization
process and that it is based on a contract or other agreement between
marriage should exist within a menu of alternatives because it increases families' options,
other ways exist to expand options without infringing on people's rights to end their
relationships with minimal government interference. For example, Elizabeth Scott suggests
that people could choose between regular no-fault divorce and divorce with an imposed
waiting period but without the requirement of grounds for divorce. See Elizabeth S. Scott,
Divorce, Childwrdn Welfa, and the Cultum Wars, 9VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 95, 105 (2001).
162. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulatiig Polygamy: Intimacy Default Rules, and
Bargaiung for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (2010) (proposing a regulatory model for
contemplating polygamy).
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the parties. It should allow an easy means of termination as well as
easy means of conversion to marriage. Ideally, it would be open not
only to conjugal couples but also to relationships among relatives and
friends. Of course, designing the many details of such a system
requires amending numerous statutes, rights, and protections that are
tied to relationships-a mission that this Article does not purport to
achieve. Instead, this Article puts forth the general design of this
system, which is discussed below.
Registration Registration would take place in court or city hall
before a clerk, and should not involve vows, witnesses, or any other
symbols of solemnization, in order to reflect the secular and
contractual nature of the union.' The couple would deposit a contract
or fill in a form that lays out their rights and their obligations to each
other (more on this below). The registration would prompt a change of
status (to registered partners) that would require third parties, including
the state, to grant such couples the rights that I describe below.
Contract Registration should encourage the couple to
contemplate the legal consequences of their relationship so that they
can decide for themselves what obligations and rights their union
carries. Upon deciding these terms, the couple would draft and sign a
contract (or fill out a form) reflecting their decided-upon obligations.
To serve the flexibility of the RCR and allow the couple to change
their level of commitment to each other, the couple would have the
ability to modify the contract at any time. For the sake of privacy,
some parts of the contract could be kept confidential (such as matters
relevant to property, but not those that are relevant to third parties like
hospitals).'"
Because contracts can be complicated, intimidating, and
expensive, and because couples are often uncomfortable discussing
financial issues that are related to death or separation and questions
concerning the end of life, states should make the contract process as
163. There is an argument to make that, because the RCR is built on maximum
flexibility and choice, it should include an option allowing a couple to choose a solemnization
process. In other words, when the couple arrives to register they could choose between
simple registration and a short exchange of vows. While this argument has some merit, it
seems that in order to keep the process as simple and accessible as possible (with a minimum
burden on the state), as well as to perpetuate the RCR's unique character as an institution that
is different than marriage and that lacks the symbolic values of marriage, it should not
include any rituals.
164. The fact that some terms of the contract are confidential does not mean that third
parties would be unaware of the obligations that a couple have to each other, because the
couple's status as registered partners would indicate that such a contract might exist and
therefore third parties could ask the couple to present the contract.
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accessible and easy as possible, ideally without the need for lawyers.
There are several ways they might do this. In one system (similar to
the French model), the couple would deposit a contract with an official
registrar. (It is expected that, upon the creation of the RCR, there
would be many standard forms of contracts available.)"' Alternatively
and preferably, to advance simplicity and efficiency, the state could
choose to offer a form in the style of Colorado's designated
beneficiary scheme that would be available via the Internet and easy to
understand and fill out. In such cases, couples would check boxes
indicating which obligations they accept, which they reject, and
specify for which functions-for example, making end-of-life
decisions-they designate their partner.'66 In a Colorado-style system,
there is no need for default rules because the parties must address all
the legal activities concerning their relationships.'
Rights, benefits, and obligations: In order to contemplate which
rights, benefits, and obligations should accompany the RCR, we can
roughly divide the relevant rights, benefits, and obligations into two
sets. One set consists of those in which the state enforces the partner's
wish to designate the other partner for a legal purpose. In this role, the
state helps enforce the choice that the state assumes that the partners
would make or the expressed choice about the role of the other partner.
For example, by designating the surviving partner as the heir of a
decedent dying intestate, or by allowing a partner to make end-of-life
decisions, the state assumes that such a designation is the wish of the
other partner and enforces their wishes.
The second set of rights and benefits contains the cases in which
the state recognizes the partnership between the couple and confers
rights and benefits upon their status. In this case the couple often
seeks the rights and benefits that are granted by the state. Either these
rights are given only upon the couple's request, or the couple is able to
waive these rights. For example, immigration rights are granted upon
165. Sanger, supo note 134, at 1315-16; cf Zelinsky, supra note 129, at 1182.
166. Another possible model could allow people to register without a contract; the
couple would sign a declaration stating that they are registered partners according to the
terms of the law. In such system, the default rules would define the partners' obligations and
rights. This is the case in France, where most couples simply sign a statement agreeing to the
terms of the PACS. See BOWmAN, supra note 15, at 210. While such a system has the
advantage of simplicity, it neuters essential components of the RCR by making it more like a
civil union than a flexible institution different from marriage.
167. In a contract-style system, there is a possibility that the parties will not address
some issues. This possibility could be dealt with by requiring that the parties address certain
issues or by creating default rules that are different from those for marriage and that reflect
the nature of the nonmarital arrangement as an intermediate level of commitment.
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request and testimonial spousal privileges may be waived by the
partners.
The RCR's main principle is that the rights, benefits, and
obligations in the first set are for the couple to choose and may be
waived by the couple. Simply put, the list of these rights, benefits, and
obligations will appear on the form (or contract), and the couples will
choose which they want. Thus couples can decide, for example, that
they do not owe spousal support and/or do not designate each other to
make medical decisions, but they can still designate each other as a
beneficiary of their life insurance policies.
Regarding the second set of rights, benefits, and obligations, the
couples are eligible for most rights and benefits that the state offers.
However, the eligibility for a minority of those rights could be
conditioned upon the existence of certain terms, according to the
purpose of the law. The basic principle is that since marriage is still a
primary way to distribute benefits and protections, there is no reason to
prefer married couples over others. However, sometimes the logic of
why legal protection is granted to couples clearly does not apply to the
RCRs. For instance, there is no reason to grant Social Security
survivor benefits to couples who were not economically interde-
pendent.
The kinds of rights that are included in the RCR could possibly
raise many questions and concerns: which rights are included and
which are excluded? How would the state decide RCR eligibility, and
in what way would the state handle the bureaucracy that such a change
obliges? Some readers will be alarmed by the opportunities for fraud
in such a regime; others will ask why we should reward couples who
do not support each other or why we should allow rights shopping. I
discuss all these concerns in the Subpart on theoretical foundations.'
For now, it suffices to say that the law already recognizes, in some
instances, that state benefits could be divided not only based on marital
status, but also on the fiction of the family or the choice of the
168. The proposed system would create some legal challenges for the system that
exists today, but not so many that it would require fundamental changes or new legal theories.
One question concerns the validity of other documents that possibly contradict the RCR
agreement. In Colorado, the designated beneficiary agreement is superseded and set aside to
the extent that it conflicts with another valid legal instrument, such as a will, a power of
attorney, or a beneficiary designation on an insurance policy or pension plan. Such a legal
rule seems to create unwanted consequences because it gives the partners an opportunity to
suppress the meaning of the RCR agreement, possibly without the other partner's knowledge.
Thus, I suggest that the partner who wants to sign documents that contradict the agreement
needs to notify the registrar by depositing the document creating the change with the registrar,
in order to make sure that the other partner knows about the change.
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person. For example, while marital deduction of estate tax is still
privileged, every person also receives an equivalent estate tax
exemption that allows them to avoid estate taxes on up to $2 million of
property left to nonspouses.'" Another example of a functional
approach is that a divorced, surviving partner is eligible for Social
Security survivor benefits upon meeting some conditions, including
caring for a child of the deceased partner.
The law also imposes obstacles in granting some rights in the
form of the required time period that the couple must spend together in
order to establish eligibility for certain rights or benefits (temporal
requirement). Under the current law, in some cases a married couple is
eligible for rights and benefits only after they have been married for
some time. For example, a spouse is eligible for Medicare coverage if
the couple is married a minimum of a year.'
On a more essential point, the American legal system simply
grants too many rights based solely on marital status-often when the
status is unrelated to the function of the family or is not a good proxy
for economic interdependency between the spouses."' In fact, in many
areas of the law, the legal justifications behind the statutes that give
preference to married couples are outdated and undesirable.
Therefore, until the correlation between marriage and benefits
distribution changes, the RCR might perpetuate such flaws in the
current system. In other words, because a married couple acquires
some rights based on status even though marriage is no longer a proxy
for economic interdependence, registered couples should likewise
receive such benefits. Thus the RCR should generally entail most of
the benefits marriage currently provides-if the couple so chooses.
Temlaiorr. Registration should be designed to provide two
routes for termination of the relationship, in the same way as some of
the domestic partnership laws in the United States are."' One route
should reflect the contractual nature of the relationship, thus providing
an easy means of termination without the need for a court decree. The
second route would be for couples with minor children who have not
169. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006).
170. What Air the Requirements To Receive Medicare Benefits? There Ar Many
Ways To Qualify for Meacare., TENN. DEP'T OF TREASURY, http://treasury.tn.gov/oasi/
PDFs/MEDICARE-INFORMATION.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) ("If the spouse in
question is living, the marriage to that spouse must have been in effect for one year to be
eligible for Social Security benefits and/or Medicare.").
171. See Kerry Abrams, Mariage Fau4 100 CALIF. L. REv 1, 40-44 (2012).
172. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 122A.300(2) (2012) (describing the "simplified
termination proceedings" and the terms of eligibility for such a process).
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executed any agreement about the custody or support of their children
and thus must move through the regular divorce procedure. Because
some will use an RCR as a prelude to marriage, couples who would
like to convert their registration to marriage would not need to
terminate the registration; it-as well as the contract-would
automatically terminate upon marriage.
Eligibility Theoretically, in a flexible model like the RCR, the
legal designations that stem from the relationship could be divided
between more than two partners. This is especially true with a
forward-looking approach because, in the near future, information
technology would allow third parties and state agencies to know which
person is designated for what purposes. For example, one could
designate their mother to make end-of-life decisions and designate
their intimate partner to be their only heir. Yet, I suggest, registration
would be permitted only between two people.'" This position stems
from the pragmatic nature and realpolitik approach that are the
foundation of the RCR. First, politically, having the RCR open to
more than two people may destroy the possibility that RCRs will be
developed from current civil unions-an institution that is open only to
two people. In addition, opening the institution to more than two
people would ignite the political resistance of people who oppose
polyamorous relationships. Second, the legal system in the United
States is bound up so closely with, and organized so thoroughly
around, the concept of couples that it is very difficult to disaggregate
this concept from that of the conferral of many rights and benefits.
Thus, adding more than one person to an RCR poses the same
fundamental difficulty that polyamorous relationships bring to the law:
how to divide state benefits and rights between more than one
designated person. While disaggregating marriage from many of the
attached rights and benefits seems like the right thing to do, and
perhaps is even possible, it also does not look, realistically, like it is a
process that could happen in the near future. Because RCR's baseline
is current US. family law, the institution will be limited to two people
only.174
173. But cf Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits., 106 MICH. L. REv 189, 230
(2007) ("In order to recognize that people can and do rely on multiple people to perform
different functions in their lives, and that these people and functions can shift over time,
family law would have to go well beyond proposals permitting individuals to name one
designated friend or even a spouse plus a best friend.").
174. The fact that the registration is only open for two people does not mean that
registrants cannot designate other people for specific activities. For example, if two friends
are registered, one of them may still designate a third friend to be that person's successor (by
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There should be no requirements for common residency or the
amount of time the couple must have been together, and no fidelity
requirement-just as marriage does not have such prerequisites.
Registration should be open to every type of partnership-romantic or
otherwise, including those between family members-as long as
neither partner is married or partnered with another person.
B. Theoretical lustificaions
1. Autonomy
Autonomy-the idea that a "person is a (part) author of his own
life,""5 with the ability to self-govern with minimum restraints-is one
of the basic foundations of Western industrial democracies, including
American law." In the past, the idea that the family unit (or its
members as individuals) enjoyed autonomy in its formation "would
have been considered an oxymoron to the extent that the issue arose at
all."'" Couples had limited options in forming and structuring their
relationships as well as in their termination. For example, the legal
consequences of marriage-the spouses' obligations to each other-
were rigidly dictated by the state and could not be modified or
contracted by the couple. The marriage contract reflected the
patriarchal idea that the husband was responsible for the financial
support of the family and the woman provided domestic services."
Similarly, divorce was strictly controlled by the state; couples could not
privately decide that they wanted to end their marriage but had to
will). One may argue that marriage's default rules still impose obligations between the
partners that justify the states' decision against imposing any additional requirements to
verify the sincerity of the relationship. Because these obligations (spousal support, for
instance) are not included in the RCR, one could argue that there are reasons to set minimum
requirements of eligibility for an institution that provides some rights and benefits.
Nevertheless, marriage does not necessarily include any of these obligations because couples
can modify obligations by contract.
175. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
176. AUTONOMY IN THE LAw 1, 1 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 2007).
177. June Carbone, Autonomy To Choose What Constitutes Family: Oxymoron or
Basic IRight? in AUTONOMY INTHE LAw, supm note 176, at 1, 11, 12-13. This does not mean
that autonomy was completely foreign to family law. Autonomy was given to the family as a
unit, just not to its members as individuals. The state avoided interfering in the family, even
where it should have, such as in cases of domestic violence and child abuse, because the
domain of the family was seen as private. See generally Judith G. McMullen, Pivacy Family
Autonomy and the Maltreated Chil 75 MARQ. L. REv. 569 (1992) (arguing that throughout
history "American law and policy have been so fiercely protective of privacy and autonomy
within the family").
178. Jana B. Singer, The Pivatization ofamily Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv 1443, 1456.
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provide grounds (selected from a list dictated by the state) to justify
their desire to divorce."'
However, family law has changed dramatically since then and
now grants individuals increased autonomy in choosing the form that
their families take, leaning toward allowing private ordering." For
example, the wife is no longer required to take her husband's name or
to provide domestic work, and the obligation to support the family
financially falls on both partners."' In many states, premarital couples
are free to contract about their property rights and maintenance
obligations.' No-fault divorce has transformed the termination
process, lessening state control and giving couples more freedom to
make their own choices. This increased autonomy can also be seen
both in the repeal of laws against adultery and fornication in many
jurisdictions and in the right of unmarried partners to contract the
economic terms of their partnerships (in most states).
Even with these changes, family law in the United States today
hardly reflects the full self-sufficiency expected in a society built on
the principle of autonomy. Joseph Raz suggests that personal
autonomy is an essential feature of flourishing life.' For Raz, a
person can live an autonomous life only if they are given an adequate
range of options.18 In terms of adequate choices, it is variety that
matters, not quantity. For instance, adequate choice does not exist if a
buyer can choose from among a hundred houses that are all the same;
an adequate choice would be one between town house, town flat, and
suburban house.' To ensure adequacy of choice, Raz contends, it is
not enough that the state be committed to noninterference (negative
liberty); rather, the state is obligated to "create conditions which enable
[its] subjects to enjoy greater liberty than they otherwise would."186
The menu-of-options approach does the most to support such
autonomy in family formation.' Currently, the ways for people to
179. Id. at 1470-74.
180. Id at 1444-46.
181. Id. at 1458-62.
182. UNF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983).
183. RAz, supm note 175.
184. Id. at 373.
185. Id. at 375.
186. Id at 18-19.
187. Shahar Lifshitz suggests a similar justification for promoting autonomy and
plurality in family law. He suggests that "the law should design marriage and cohabitation as
separate spousal institutions as part of society's responsibility to provide a diveisity ofspousal
institutions." Lifshitz, supm note 61, at 1569. Lifshitz's model, however, is significantly
different from the one I propose because it suggests imposing different obligations upon
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arrange their relationships include marriage, civil unions or domestic
partnerships (in some states), and informal unions. Couples in
informal unions can sometimes contract about the terms of their
relationships, but they cannot enjoy the rights and benefits offered by
the state and other third parties; thus, they must choose between
marriage and giving up important rights. And similar to the person
who must select one house from a hundred similar houses, couples
who choose between civil union and marriage choose between the
same thing under two different names, which allows for only so much
autonomy. The RCR offers an additional option, one that allows
couples maximum autonomy in choosing the form and legal content of
their relationships and is most consistent with Raz's definition of
autonomy. In the previous Part, I warned that the list of options
currently offered by the menu-of-options approach presents too many
choices. While choice is fundamental to autonomy, when there are too
many options "choice no longer liberates, but debilitates.""m Adding
the RCR to the menu of options is consistent with this view, as it does
not create too many options in a way that may, de facto, decrease
autonomy-but adds one more alternative that is very flexible.
In essence, in RCRs the state facilitates private ordering and
provides benefits that people would not otherwise get. The state helps
people to organize their lives under a defined framework and
encourages couples to define and address their rights and obligations
with each other. Couples may find registering their relationships a
useful way to avoid the invasion of privacy and the hassle involved in
constantly proving their relationships. Adopting the RCR does not
mean that nonregistered couples will have no rights. For example, in
some cases it is consistent with the purpose of the law to allow
unregistered partners (including friends or intimate partners) to sue for
wrongful death. An RCR only saves the couple the necessity of
proving the nature or significance of their relationships. Thus the RCR
does not decrease selection, but helps some people to organize their
lives in advance.
But the RCR can also be the first step toward the development of
a much broader understanding of autonomy and pluralism in family
formation. It can advance, in the words of Katherine Franke,
different kinds of cohabiting couples. His proposal is based on an opt-out regime and, in my
opinion, suffers from some of the same problems posed by functionalist proposals, mainly the
complexity of the legal mechanism and the lack of incentive to register Most important, his
proposal attempts to solve the problem by ensuring couples' rights only upon dissolution.
188. SCHWARTZ, supm note 140, at 2.
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"nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and sexuality."'" The
RCR helps repudiate the idea that there is only one path toward
happiness and self-fulfillment-that is, marriage-by offering
autonomy to people marginalized by the limited choices that legal
regimes currently offer.'o This type of flexible registration, open to
friends and family members, enables such people (for example,
singles) to celebrate their lives and preferences with dignity. The RCR
allows, in some cases, for easier termination of relationships, thus
rejecting the notion that all relationships last forever-a notion
perpetuated by the fact that termination of marriage requires state
approval.
Importantly, an opt-in regime, rather than an opt-out mechanism,
offers autonomy because it does not force duties upon couples with
which they do not necessarily agree. Having the option of RCR
schemes does not mean that the law should not enforce contractual or
implied agreements between unmarried partners. However, going as
far as to impose marital status on couples in the absence of an ex ante
agreement (as suggested by several legal scholars) misses the point
that some unmarried partners choose not to enter into marriage
because they do not wish to assume marital obligations-and thus
disproportionally interferes with their autonomy."'
One may argue that the highest level of autonomy exists when the
state refrains from endorsing any relationships and conferring any
rights or benefits on any couples.'92 However, the state does have
important reasons to acknowledge partnerships.' By doing so, the
189. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1399, 1414 (2004).
190. See Nadine E Marks & James David Lambert, Maital Status Continuity and
Change Among Young and Midlife Adults Longitudinal Effects on Psychological Well-
Being, 19 J. FAM. ISSUES 652, 670-74 (1998) (finding that people who have never married
become more depressed and less happy over time, have less positive relations with others, but
also are more likely than married people to be autonomous and to experience personal
growth).
191. See, eg., Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1982) ("We realize that
couples enter into these unstructured domestic relationships in order to avoid the rights and
responsibilities that the State imposes on the marital relationship."); see also Katherine M.
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv 2685, 2696-98 (2008) (arguing that the
ALI principles expend the shadow of marriage, and that under the ALI principles, the form of
the relationship, not the parties' intent, is relevant).
192. Cf Emens, supm note 63, at 263-69 (imagining a world in which "there would
not only be no marriage, there would be no enforceable contracts between intimate
partners").
193. I do not argue that marriage provides the only way to fulfill the regulatory
component, just that some sort of partnership recognition is essential for identifying partners
for a variety of reasons.
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state responds to the reality that people frequently organize their lives
with a partner and that such partnerships have significant emotional,
financial, and legal implications.1' For example, by recognizing
relationships, the state allows a person to live with a partner from a
different country and grants the latter citizenship.'" Similarly, when a
partner in a state-recognized relationship inherits the property of their
deceased partner, that inheritance is exempt from estate taxes. 96 State
interventions like these are not inconsistent with the notion of
autonomy as Raz conceives it. Such interventions are simply a form of
positive liberty; accordingly, the state intervenes "actively to create the
conditions necessary for individuals to be self-sufficient or to achieve
self-realization." 97
Notwithstanding the importance of the foregoing benefits of
state-recognized relationships, I do not endorse state intervention that
favors partners in relationships, on the one hand, and comparatively
disfavors single persons, on the other. By limiting the extension of a
panoply of rights and benefits to married people, the state is not only
unjustly excluding single persons and others in nontraditional
relationships from enjoying such privileges but also diminishing their
autonomy. Therefore, while the state should intervene to help its
subjects to organize their affairs, it should not isolate marriage (or any
other legally recognized partnership) as a means for distributing
benefits.'"
One purported alternative is to disinvolve the state from
recognizing varying forms of relationships and, instead, to have the
state recognize and enforce contracts entered into by such partners.
This model, it could be argued, would absolve the state from
encouraging partners to adopt a registration scheme and, accordingly,
respect the autonomy of persons who would rather not register and
194. Case suggests that the rationale behind the state endorsement of partnerships may
be "the assumption that the social good is likely to be promoted when government facilitates
people working together to achieve joint ends." Case, suply note 109, at 1782.
195. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (2006); Scott C. Titshaw,
The Meanrng ofMariage: Immigration Rules and Thei- Implications for Same-Sex Spouses
in a World WithoutDOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 546-49 (2010) (describing
the significance of marriage under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
196. See26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2006).
197. Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ (last revised Oct.
8, 2007).
198. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 1989
OUT/LOOK 9, reprinted in WE ARE EVERYWHERE: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK IN GAY AND
LESBIAN POLITICS 757 (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997) (asserting that marriage
allows the state to make a distinction in distributing public funds).
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who consider any such encouragement to register to be the state's
invasion of their privacy. I argue that this assertion, though logical, is
simplistic. In essence, even if the state endorses a deregulation regime
based on contracts only, the state's enforcement of contracts or grant of
rights flowing from that regime still constitutes state intervention. In
addition, the union of two people has so many consequences in the
fields of inheritance, medical decision making, taxes, debt, and
property, to name just a few, that it is important for the state to respond
to these consequences with an efficient mechanism. It can do so
through a registration scheme, rather than by relying on several
documents: a will, power of attorney, contract between the partners,
and so on.' Thus, when the state does not rely solely on contracts but
offers an opt-in scheme as well, the government is not intruding into
people's lives but, instead, giving people a better means of regulating
the legal implications of their relationships. The state also has a
compelling interest in offering registration schemes, based on an
efficiency justification: with opt-in schemes, the state would not have
to examine the relationship of each and every applicant for each
benefit based on contracts alone." Moreover, relying on contracts for
each right would open up an opportunity for fraud.
Finally, one could argue that the justification to provide rights and
benefits via marriage is that marriage imposes some duties on the
couples-toward each other and toward third parties. The obligations
toward each other can be divided into two groups: responsibilities
during the marriage (the duty of support and services) and obligations
at the end of the marriage (spousal support). Indeed, an RCR may not
include any of these duties, or may include only very modest
obligations between the partners. Therefore, the argument goes, the
state should not expand benefits to registered partners who do not have
obligations similar to those incurred by married couples. I argue that
the basic assumptions in this argument are flawed. The duty of support
and services, in reality, is not only vague but very often unenforce-
able.201 Further, marriage today does not necessarily entail any
obligations between the partners and third parties after divorce because
199. Cf Case, supm note 109, at 1780 ("while it is theoretically possible with some
changes in the law to achieve through a network of private contract many of the benefits of
marriage, marriage may have some efficiency advantages, especially given how much of the
law is currently structured around it.").
200. Such a system demands that for each benefit the state provides there will be a
system that examines the validity of contracts.
201. See Perry, supm note 131, at 13-16.
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couples can contract about alimony and division of property, and they
can waive these obligations completely.
2. Gender Equality
In addition to reflecting and supporting the ways in which people
live their lives-thus promoting autonomy and pluralism by permitting
individuals to explore diverse ways of living-family law should
advance gender equality.202 By offering an alternative that is not
associated with marriage's symbolism and acts to reduce the harm that
symbolism creates, the RCR may have enormous effects on gender
equality. At the same time, however, the shift to a more private and
contractual type of relationship regime may exacerbate existing gender
inequalities. In this Subpart, I first examine how RCRs help to achieve
gender equality, and then what its disadvantages to gender equality
might be.
a. Reducing the Symbolic Harm of Marriage
Some people, me included, view the expressive component of
marriage, which has clear practical effects, as harmful.203 Historically,
"[m]arriage was the principal institution that maintained the
patriarchy."" It left women without legal rights or legal personhood,205
it was a venue in which rape was exempted from punishment,2" and it
is still a regime in which domestic violence often occurs.207 While
marriage, as a legal and societal institution, has gone through dramatic
changes-such as the repeal of coverture and marital rape
exemptions-and continues to do so,20 it would nevertheless be a
mistake to believe that its expressive symbolism is only historical."
202. Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 194-201.
203. See, e.g., Chambers, supm note 129.
204. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 167, 170 (2000).
205. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw:
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the legal meaning of coverture).
206. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal Hstory of
Maital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1373 (2000) (describing the legal history of marital rape
exemptions and feminists' efforts to repeal these laws).
207. See Claudia Card, AgahstMarnage andMotherhood 11 HYPATIA 1, 8 (1996).
208. Cf Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rjgts for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.YU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567,
588-91 (1994) (arguing that marriage can continue to evolve to meet the needs and values of
people).
209. See Nan D. Hunter, Mariage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. &
SEXUALITY 9, 18-19 (1991).
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Indeed, marriage is "still a central instrument in the denial of women's
status as full citizens."2 10 Some critics of marriage argue that marriage
perpetuates the gendered division of labor roles,2"' and as a result of
that division, women fare more poorly in the employment market and
thus are more dependent on their spouses.212  Feminist accounts
indicate that marriage is a tool to control and direct women's behavior
and to reinforce traditional gender roles by stigmatizing unmarried
women when they reach a certain age.213
RCRs could help to reduce some of marriage's expressive harm.
First, it provides a different option for legal recognition of
relationships, with a different name. Marriage's name is important;
language affecting status and naming is used by the state, particularly
in family law, to "reflect and reinforce a gender-hierarchical
conception of marriage. 214 In the same way that marriage-equality
advocates argue that civil unions are inferior to marriage because the
word "marriage" has cultural value,215 critics of marriage contend that
marriage has a negative universal and historical meaning and that its
significance and impact have not disappeared, nor can they easily be
changed. With an RCR, the wedding is replaced by registration, thus
eliminating some of the harmful aspects of the wedding ceremony and
marriage's name. In addition, legal recognition of nonmarital
relationships may lessen the rigid gender role division associated with
marriage because research has consistently shown that unmarried
couples are less bound by traditional gender roles and the associated
division of household responsibilities.2 16
210. Jyl Josephson, Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist Cntiques of
Mariage, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 269, 276 (2005); see also Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marniage
Equality, 34 HAR. J.L. & GENDER 37, 44 (2011) ("Although women's legal status within
marriage has improved significantly, marriage still reflects and reinforces gender hierarchy to
a significant degree.").
211. See, e.g., Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
FamilyRhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181, 2188 (1995).
212. See Jyl J. Josephson & Cynthia Burack, The Political Ideology of the Neo-
TraditionalFamily, 3 J.POL. IDEOLOGIES 213, (1998).
213. Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the Traditional
Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 521 (1998).
214. Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marrige: Language and Status in
Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 895 (2010).
215. Cf Misha Isaak, Comment, "Whath in a Name?" Civil Unions and the
Constitutional Significance of "Manige, " 10 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 607, 612 (2008) (arguing
that because state recognition of marriage carries with it social acceptance, denial of such
recognition may be unconstitutional).
216. BOWMAN, supra note 15, at 144.
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Another way in which RCRs can help reduce marriage's harm is
by transforming the married-versus-unmarried dichotomy, which has
stigmatized single women and pushed them to marry, because it
provides an alternative to marriage that is open to nonromantic
couples. It has become increasingly common for people to rely on
friends to fulfill important roles in their lives, such as that of
caregiver.217 For example, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) community and the African-American community are known
for historically relying on friends, neighbors, and extended or
alternative families for support in caring for themselves and their
children.2 8 Therefore, "[e]xplicit legal recognition of friendship could
... eliminate some of the stigma experienced by people living outside
of state-sanctioned coupling, because other personal relationships
would be recognized by the state."219 A menu of options would
significantly alter the discourse: people could be registered with a
friend, a sexual partner, or a future spouse.220
b. Perils of Privatization for Women
While privatization of family law-including the creation of
contractual regimes and the easy termination of relationships-can
offer women tremendous freedom, it can also reinforce gender
inequality in a few ways."' First, a contractual regime is often unequal
when one party is weaker. Second, if a woman declines maintenance
and property division rights upon signing a contract, she cannot later
win an ex post contractual remedy. In such a case, she might have
been better off in an informal cohabitation arrangement without an
RCR. Third, an easy termination process-in which there is no judge
to supervise the process and in which fewer cultural and legal hurdles
217. Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 208-12 (describing a series of sociological studies
showing that people are not engaging in romantic relationships as much as they once did and
that instead of relying on family members with whom they share a home, they are relying on
friends outside the home).
218. See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Famly: BeyondExclusivy to a
Care-Based Standarg 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 96 (2004).
219. Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 228.
220. Cf id. at 220-29 (arguing that legal recognition of friends as family or a focus on
the care that couples provide each other, rather than the status of the couple, could eliminate
stigma experienced by nontraditional couples).
221. Cf Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 192-93 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) ("Given the persistent sex-based disparities in social, economic,
and political resources in this society, such laissez-faire policies are not gender-neutral. As in




exist to make the breakup tougher-may make divorce even more
common, rendering some women and children more vulnerable.
The first problem is that of bargaining power. There is no doubt
that, because of marriage's societal power and the economic
inequalities that pressure women to get married, many women do not
have bargaining power equal to that of men when entering into
marriage and setting its terms.222 This inequality is also exacerbated by
the fact that women often marry earlier than men and thus may have
less of an understanding of what they want their marriage to look
like.223 Therefore, the risk of RCRs is that women would not have
equal power to bargain over the legal terms of their relationships.
Without default rules of distribution of property and maintenance (or a
requirement to opt out in the case of status-based remedies for
cohabitants), some women could end up with even less favorable rights
than those they have under the current regime.
On the other hand, while these concerns are valid, RCRs may
improve the situation of some women by making the women aware of
their own vulnerability and providing them with greater certainty about
their legal rights.224 Unmarried partners, unless they have contracted,
currently live with uncertainty about what rights (if any) they may have
upon dissolution of their relationship. Their rights are dependent upon
the state in which they live, the judge assigned to their case, and their
ability to prove that they had an implied contract. Furthermore, many
cohabitants may not give much thought to what rights they deserve. In
the same way that marriage conceals the inequality of the employment
market from some women-because they get health insurance through
their husbands' employers and combine their salaries with those of
their husbands-the pooling of unmarried couples' incomes may make
some women unaware of the difficulties that they will face upon the
end of their relationship.225 Therefore, even if RCRs perpetuate the
weaker bargaining power of some women, they still have a "signaling
effect," which allows individuals to determine their partners'
intentions; 6 women would at least be more informed of their legal
position and their partners' intentions.
222. Abrams, supra note 213, at 520-22.
223. Id.at 521.
224. Cf Scott, supra note 72, at 242-43 (arguing that the official requirements of
marriage registration help to clarify the terms and the meaning of the contract and encourage
deliberation about the contract's terms).
225. Rhode& Minow, supm note 221, at 193.
226. Cf Robert Rowthorn, Mamage as a Sigal, m THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 132, 132 (Antony W Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002)
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The second problem is that when a woman signs a contract that
does not include rights for distribution of property and spousal
support, she may lose the option to win an ex post facto contractual
remedy for distribution of property and spousal support. Accordingly,
by signing a contract, the partners show that they did not intend to have
obligations for distribution and maintenance. While this argument has
some merit, a deeper analysis is required to understand why, in most
cases, it is better to have an RCR than to rely on a court to award
compensation based on contractual claims, which can be costly to
pursue and certainly does not ensure that the outcome will be in the
woman's favor.
Most of the population that would take advantage of RCRs would
still benefit from them. We can divide opposite-sex couples who
would use RCRs into three categories: those informal cohabitants
who, without signing a contract, do not have any sort of arrangement
for legal recognition of their relationship; those couples who would get
married if RCRs did not exist (but would prefer not to); and those who
would use the registration only temporarily as a prelude to marriage.
For the first group, RCRs would allow them to enjoy more rights from
the state during the relationship, which may compensate for some of
the losses at the end of the relationship. The second group probably
consists of women who are more educated and empowered and thus
are in a better position to negotiate the contract they benefit from.22
The third group, premarital couples, often do not have any
expectations concerning property distribution or support, and on
average, short-term relationships will not be granted spousal support
or will be granted a very small amount.228 Thus, it is not clear that a
woman's "right" to claim an ex post contractual remedy-which
demands lawyers, a trial, and an invasion of privacy-is any better for
her than an RCR without property distribution and spousal support.
The final concern with regard to the privatization of relationship
regimes is divorce, which often results in greater losses for women
(explaining that marriage functions as a signal that one party is interested in a committed
relationship and offers the rest of the world information about the couple's intentions).
227. I assume that this group would be composed of women who are more educated
and better economically situated, because there are some indications that educated, career
women prefer cohabitation because it gives them more freedom at work and allows them to
avoid traditional gender roles. See BowMAN, supra note 15, at 121-22.
228. In New Zealand, for example, the rules of equal property distribution require that
the couple cohabit or be married for three years before the rule is applicable to them. "The
justification for a restriction of this kind is that the statutory regime should be imposed on
people only where there has been some level of commitment over a period of time." Atkin,
supd note 159, at 316.
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than for men. Not infrequently, for instance, women lack the money to
hire an attorney and thus represent themselves. 229  Women can be
pressured-by financial means or even abuse-to agree to unfair
divorce settlements.230 Moreover, it is often difficult for some divorced
women, who have spent their lives attending to their families, to enter
the job market; 23 1 women often remain their children's main caretakers
after a divorce, which places limitations on their ability to work. The
presence of a judge in the divorce process, which in an RCR would
occur only when the couple has minor children and would still require
a court decree, may reduce some of these inequalities if the judge
rejects a divorce stipulation that is unfair, or if the judge helps the
woman understand the need for a lawyer. In addition, removing the
current legal, psychological, and cultural hurdles for termination of
relationships may make couples' separation even more widespread
than it currently is.232
Although enabling people to dissolve unions more easily may
exacerbate existing societal inequities, the easy route to termination
provided by the RCR also has positive aspects. Importantly, it is
assumed that some couples who would otherwise informally
cohabitate (an arrangement in which they can simply leave the
partnership) will choose the RCR; the RCR creates few barriers to
separation because the couple need only officially finalize the
dissolution of the relationship. Moreover, some feminists believe that
it is better to have an easy termination process, which allows women to
more quickly end an abusive or oppressive relationship.23' Divorce
termination may also mean escape from dependency on and
subordination to husbands and may assist and encourage more women
on their way to self-realization.234
229. Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement
Negotiations, 74 DENv. U. L. REv 931, 931 (1997).
230. Id.
231. Scott, supm note 92, at 555.
232. Cf Scott, supm note 161, at 104 (arguing that under modem divorce law spouses
who are not deterred by nonlegal barriers like religion are more likely to divorce than under
no-fault divorce law).
233. See Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Maninge "For the Sake of the Children" A
Feminist Reply to Elzabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1435, 1443-46 (1992).




Additionally, the duration of marriages has declined in the past
decades, and some marriages end shortly after they begin.235 Such
short-term relationships often carry fewer legal consequences, and an
easier dissolution process is more appropriate for these relationships.
Because the nature of the RCR is that of an institution that is flexible
in dealing with different levels of commitments, it seems plausible that
some people (for example, those in the premarital stage and the
divorced) would choose it precisely for its easy termination process.
In summary, the RCR can be a double-edged sword. It can
facilitate the move toward reducing marriage's harm, a significant
problem for women today. But at the same time, this legal reform-
intended to achieve a more egalitarian society--can actually
exacerbate disparities because of already existing inequalities. Yet,
despite the problems that the RCR may pose, its implementation is
more likely to lead to important social changes, fostering greater
equality and increased autonomy. In other words, while the intention
of the RCR model is to increase gender equality, it also aims to
promote autonomy and pluralism in family formation. Thus, even if
the RCR results in a net loss for women as a class in a minority of
cases, its other benefits nonetheless justify its adoption.
C Possible Weaknesses ofRCRs
There are three other possible concerns about the RCR model.
First, would states actually adopt such a scheme? Second, even if
some states do, would the federal government follow suit and, if it did
not, would registration at the state level still be attractive to partners?
Third, is it realistic to think that people would choose contract-based
registration over marriage given that common wisdom suggests that
most Americans would choose marriage over other alternatives due to
its cultural and religious significance? This Subpart explores these
concerns.
1. Could the RCR Happen?
The idea of adopting marriage alternatives based on contracts in
the United States may sound revolutionary and unrealistic; it is not.
Marriage alternatives based on registration already exist in several
states. The existence of such models does not present new theories or
235. See, e.g., Paula Mergenhag DeWitt, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, 14 AM.




complexities in the law, because contractual relationships are now an
inseparable component of legal jurisprudence in the United States.
Moreover, the legislature has some compelling reasons to introduce
such alternatives, as I explain below.
The process leading to the creation of marriage alternatives has
its roots in the days when the LGBT movement tried to introduce
domestic-partnership legislation with the declared intent of creating
options other than marriage and motivated by its ideological resistance
to marriage.236 Ironically, despite dogged efforts by today's LGB"'
organizations to legalize same-sex marriage (often by casting civil
unions and other alternatives as "inferior" to marriage), the struggle
for same-sex marriage has been an important force in the creation of
marriage alternatives. It brought about the enactment of compromises,
in the form of civil unions and domestic partnerships, that are
sometimes open to opposite-sex couples as well. William Eskridge
observes that these alternatives will continue to exist and thus will be a
force in the creation of a menu of choices because "[e]ach step toward
same-sex marriage is typically (but not always) sedimentary rather
than displacing earlier reforms, the new reform simply adds another
legal rule or institution on top of an earlier one.""
This has occurred, however, much less often than Eskridge
suggests: in most cases, in both Europe and the United States,
alternatives to marriage were abolished once same-sex marriage was
legalized.239 In fact, only in a minority of cases have the alternatives
236. Nancy D. Polikoff, Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and
Relationships, 61 RUTGERS L. REv. 529, 532-33 (2009).
237. I use the acronym "LGB" rather than "LGBT" because I am not sure if
organizations that are focused on transgender rights are also concerned about the issue of
marriage equality.
238. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002).
239. In this regard, we can divide civil union schemes into two groups: those that are
automatically abolished when same-sex marriage is legalized and those that survive. In cases
falling into the former group (for instance, New Hampshire's), couples' unions have been
automatically "upgraded" to marriage, often leading to confusing legal situations in which
many couples who never expressed a desire to be married suddenly are. See, eg., N.H. REV.
STAT. § 457:46(11) (2012) (ordering that effective January 1, 2011, all existing civil unions
would legally be converted into marriages).
In other places, such as Norway, couples who are already registered have the option to
stay registered or to convert their unions to marriages, but new civil unions can no longer be
registered, rendering them extinct. A Marriage Act for All, MINISTRY CHILD. EQUALITY &
Soc. INCLUSION (June 17, 2008), http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/Topics/equality-and-
discrimination/homosexuality/a-marriage-act-for-all--entering-into-fo.html?id=509376. In
Vermont, similarly, the legalization of same-sex marriage "discontinued the need for the
separate status of 'civil unions."' Thus, couples cannot register new civil unions, but the
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survived the legalization of same-sex marriage, and even in places
where civil unions still exist, they are hardly used (with the exception
of Belgium).240
One could argue, then, that the destiny of the RCR will be no
different; it will be used as a compromise in the absence of same-sex
marriage and will be abolished when same-sex marriage is legalized.
While there is merit to this argument, the RCR may be different from
the institutions that have been abolished. When civil unions are solely
intended to block or slow the process toward same-sex marriage, and
when they are almost identical to marriage, there is no reason to
maintain the separate institution after the legalization of same-sex
marriage, nor is there a reason for most opposite-sex couples to choose
them. In addition, marriage alternatives are new and thus often
unfamiliar to many, which is a disadvantage that conventional
institutions like marriage do not have.24' However, if these alternatives
were truly different from marriage (not just different in name), they
would be much more likely to survive the legalization of same-sex
marriage. What happens to the RCR and other marriage alternatives
that are significantly different from marriage will be dependent, to a
large extent, on the number of people who use them, the legislature's
and the general public's awareness of them, and the way they are
integrated into popular culture and everyday life.
A change in the public's perception of marriage alternatives could
happen if states understand that marriage alternatives have a more
important role than just hindering the legalization of same-sex
marriage. Importantly, it is not only the legislature and the general
public who need to recognize the importance of marriage alternatives.
Same-sex marriage advocates should stop degrading civil unions in
their efforts to legalize same-sex marriage; they can do this by
acknowledging that alternatives to marriage are beneficial to many and
status of couples who are already registered is still respected. Civil Unions & Reciprocal
Beneficiary Relationships; VT. DEP'T HEALTH, http://healthvermont.gov/research/records/cv
reciprocity.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
240. In Belgium, the number of people making a declaration of legal cohabitation per
year (cohabitation I6gale) nearly doubled in three years, from 34,605 in 2006 to 67,561 in
2009. Cohabitation Idgale, STAT. BELG., http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffires/popula
tion/mariage..divorcecohabitation/cohabitation/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
Moreover, in 2009, 65,406 opposite-sex couples registered, compared to 2155 same-sex
couples. Id. Further, in 2009 only 43,303 weddings were performed, compared to the
registration of 67,561 new cohabitations. Id.; Manages, STAT. BELc., http://statbel.fgov.
be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/mariage-divorce cohabitation/mariages/ (last visited
Jan. 29,2013).
241. Eskridge, supra note 136.
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by arguing that a number of options, including marriage, should be
open to everyone.
Despite its innovative nature, the RCR does not present
unprecedented and complex legal issues or values. Privatization of
family law and a contractual approach to relationships are concepts
that already exist in American law.242 Not only are marriage
alternatives already in existence and familiar to legislatures, but it is
also possible that moderate-to-liberal legislatures will look upon
marriage alternatives as a solution for unmarried couples that is more
appealing than other proposals. The reason is that registration is, for
the purposes of the state, better than informal unions because it
establishes a defined set of rights and allows the state to regulate some
of the aspects in which it takes an interest (statistics, efficiency, and the
like).
Finally, it is important to emphasize that despite states' current
policy of disregarding unmarried couples, legislatures will have to
address this problem at some point. Marriage has changed-it does
not hold the significance it once did, and marriage has become only
one option (even if still a powerful one) among a few with which to
arrange one's family life.243 Cohabitations and alternative families are
likely to become increasingly common,2" and at some point in the
future, a more comprehensive arrangement (not just ex post judicial
remedies) will have to be negotiated.
2. Would the Federal Government Recognize RCRs-And Does It
Matter?
A 2004 study found that 1138 federal laws tie benefits,
protections, and responsibilities-such as tax incentives, property and
inheritance rights, social benefits, joint filing for bankruptcy, and
immigration rights-to marital status.245 Many of these rights and
benefits are essential to couples. They are currently denied to same-
sex spouses, even in states in which such couples can marry, because
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) states that "the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
242. See Singer, supm note 178.
243. J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Maniage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender and
the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RuTGERS J.L. & PuB. Poi'Y 521, 527-39 (2011) (arguing
that although many in the United States still aspire to marry, cohabitation and adoption have
become increasingly popular alternate ways to create a family).
244. BOWMAN, supra note 15, at 101-02.
245. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT:
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
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husband and wife."246 A few challenges to DOMA's constitutionality
have been filed in federal courts,247 political efforts are being made to
repeal it,248 and some believe that it is likely to be repealed soon.24 9 The
question therefore is whether the federal government would recognize
marriage alternatives in a world without DOMA.
Based on Congress's long-held attitudes about the significance of
marriage, it seems unlikely that the federal government will recognize
a marriage alternative for opposite-sex couples. However, even if the
federal government does not explicitly and comprehensively recognize
marriage alternatives, that does not mean that each and every right
granted on the federal level would be restricted to married couples.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently informed an Illinois
taxpayer that opposite-sex partners in a civil union are treated as
husband and wife for purposes of filing a joint return because the state
law provides that civil partners should be treated the same under the
law as married couples.250 Thus, if the IRS treats opposite-sex couples
in civil unions as married, there is no reason for other departments and
agencies of the government to treat them differently.25'
Recognition of alternatives to marriage, under the current
Republican-controlled United States House of Representatives or even
under a more liberal Congress, seems very unlikely because marriage
holds a strong cultural and religious significance in the United
States. 252 During President George W Bush's administration, a great
246. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
247. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010) (finding DOMA unconstitutional); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2011) (finding that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional).
248. Helene Cooper, Obama To Support Repeal of Defense of Marnage Act, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2011), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/obama-to-support-
repeal-of-defense-of-marriage-act/.
249. Andrew Koppelman, Why the Supreme Court Will Stike Dow DOMA,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 19, 2011, 8:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/why-the-
supreme-court-will-strike-down-doma/.
250. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, Internal Revenue
Serv., to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), http://law.scu.
edu/blog/samesextax/file/IRS%2OCivil%2OUnion%2Oletter.pdf.
251. There is an argument to be made that even if the federal government recognizes
civil unions it does not follow that it would recognize unions under the RCR. Accordingly,
RCRs would be different than civil unions, because civil union law declares civil partners as
equivalent to spouses, while the RCR sets out a different set of rules. However, in both cases
the rationale and legal situation are similar. If the states decide to grant some rights and
benefits to couples who are not "married" it should be irrelevant to the federal government
whether they are granted through civil unions or RCRs. Nothing stops a state from
promulgating statutes that require, for the purpose of specific laws, registered couples to be
treated as married couples.
252. See infm Part VI.E.
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deal of money was invested in programs intended to promote
marriage.253 On the other hand, in a world without DOMA, the federal
government's refusal to recognize civil unions would incentivize states
to legalize same-sex marriage and to reject civil unions as a
compromise because they provide fewer rights than marriage.
Should the federal government respect each state's characteriza-
tion of what constitutes a family? Traditionally, family law was the
states' domain, but in recent decades the federal government's
involvement in family law has significantly increased, particularly in
relation to children.254 Yet despite the complex relationship between the
federal and state governments, the increased number of family law
issues that are addressed by the federal government, and the federal
courts' tendency to allow preemption of state family law when it
contradicts the policy of the federal government,255 when it comes to
the law of domestic relations, the question of what constitutes a family
is most often determined by state law.256 Normatively speaking, in the
words of Ann Laquer Estin, "the intervention of the national
government into the sphere of family regulation is less appropriate and
less useful if it is designed to serve symbolic or political purposes, or if
it restricts the states in their efforts to support and protect families and
children."257
What if the federal government refuses to recognize, or only
partially recognizes, the rights of couples who are registered under the
RCR scheme? Would people still have a reason to register? Certainly
partners would have less incentive to do so, but I believe that many
would nonetheless opt for an RCR. Registration with the state would
compel many employers to offer those employees who registered their
relationships health coverage equivalent to that offered to married
couples (but would not exempt the employer from federal taxes on the
total cost for the insurance).' Registrants could, moreover, receive
253. See, e g., Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4
(funding for marriage-promotion programs).
254. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States,
18 CORNELL JL. & PUB. PoL'Y 267, 269-70 (2009).
255. Id at 331.
256. Id. at 324.
257. Id at 335.
258. In New Jersey, where civil unions are restricted to same-sex couples, several
employers have refused to offer health insurance benefits to an employee's civil partner.
Their argument is that under the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) "self-insured" companies are governed by federal law and thus can refuse to grant
rights for civil partners, based on DOMA. See N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, THE
LEGAL, MEDICAL, EcoNoMIc & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY'S CIVIL UNION LAW
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many significant rights from the state: state tax benefits (including
inheritance tax benefits), the ability to take the surname of one's
partner, inheritance rights, medical decision-making privileges, rights
regarding division of property, spousal support, testimonial privileges,
standing in a wrongful death lawsuit, pension and insurance rights
governed by state law, and state property tax exemptions for surviving
spouses of decreased veterans (who do not remarry).' These are all
important partnership rights and protections; they carry strong
financial incentives to register. In addition, registration helps couples
avoid the hassle of proving the nature of their relationship in order to
win rights and privileges.
One might argue that divorce-related rights are often secondary in
a couple's decision to register because most people are not thinking
about the possibility of divorce when they enter into marriage. Thus
rights related to separation are less important than those related to
immigration status and federal taxation (covered by federal law).
While this argument has some merit, RCRs would still, even in the
absence of federal recognition, offer sufficient benefits and protections
to attract couples.
3. People Will Choose Marriage Even If They Are Offered Other
Options
Couples rarely consider the legal consequences of marriage on a
possible separation, let alone those of nonmarital unions. " As
mentioned earlier, most couples do not sign prenuptial agreements,
and the majority of cohabitants do not contract about property
divisions and mutual obligations.26' Couples are too optimistic about
their relationships.262 Why, therefore, would the RCR work differently?
There is no guarantee that things will be different with the RCR.
But there is a great difference between a contract between the partners
only (as in the case of most contracts between couples) and a contract
that prompts a change of status and offers rights from the state and
other third parties. Recognition and rights from the state provide
11-18 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-
Report-.pdf.
259. See Dana J. Chase & Daniel J. Sennott, State Survivor Benefits: An Overview,
ARMY LAw., Dec. 2008, at 25 (surveying states that provide tax breaks to surviving spouses
and dependents of eligible veterans).
260. See, eg., Lifshitz, supm note 61, at 1577-78.
261. See Robbennolt & Johnson, supm note 70.
262. See Sanger, supm note 134, at 1314.
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enormous incentives for couples to file a contract and register under
the RCR.
An additional concern is that most people will choose marriage
over alternatives due to its cultural, historical, and religious
components.2 63 A recent Pew Research Center survey found that most
people who have never married would like to do so someday.2 6 4Wile
many people may choose marriage over its alternatives, it is important
to note that the choice of the RCR over marriage does not have to be
permanent. It can serve as a temporary solution for people who want a
trial period or who are waiting for a financial change before getting
married. In addition, while the majority of people want to get married
because of that institution's cultural and historical value, others avoid
marriage for the exact same reason. Moreover, if alternatives to
marriage gain support, the culture that now views marriage as sacred
and inevitable may come to accept alternatives as valuable institutions
with their own cultural heritages. Most important, while the law can
be changed because of public opinion, it is also true that "public
attitudes can be influenced by changes in the law."265 In France, as
discussed below, legal reform was needed; but it was the creation of
the PACS that changed people's behaviors and attitudes. In short, the
introduction of the RCR might well move public opinion toward
favorable reconsideration of marriage alternatives.
VI. EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH PACS
As noted above, the number of opposite-sex couples who have
registered civil unions in other countries and provinces (New Zealand,
South Africa, the Netherlands, and Quebec) is significantly low.266
Interestingly, in France and Belgium the data on civil partnerships
differ from the statistics in other countries. In France, the success of
the PACS is demonstrated by its skyrocketing popularity and its
integration into the French language and cultural habits. More than a
263. See Stein, supra note 5, at 365 ("Finally, it seems that when offered the
opportunity to choose alternative relationship forms, most U.S. families opt for basic
marriage, not an alternative to it.").
264. Cohn et al., supmanote 14.
265. ESKRIDGE, supm note 238, at 115.
266. In Quebec, both opposite- and same-sex couples overwhelmingly choose
marriage over civil unions: from 2002 (when civil unions were enacted) to 2010, no more
than 225 opposite-sex couples registered annually, while every year more than 21,000
weddings were celebrated. Manages et unions civiles selon le sexe des conjoints, Quebec,




million PACSs have been registered since the form's enactment in
1999, and the number of registered couples has increased every year
(except for 2001).267 In 2009, 175,000 PACSs were registered, as
opposed to 251,000 marriages (only 5% were same-sex couples)268-
meaning that for every two marriages in France, a PACS is
registered."'
Evidence of the popularity and success of the PACS goes beyond
the numbers. Daniel Borrillo and Eric Fassin explain that the PACS
"is now part of the culture, as evidenced by its acceptance in the
French language: the acronym PaCS is no longer capitalized, as both
noun-les pacsis [parties to a PACS]-and verb-se pacser [to enter
into a PACS]-have entered everyday parlance."270 The cultural
significance of the PACS is further indicated by the fact that wedding
fairs have been renamed to recognize the existence of the PACS,
department stores now offer PACS gift registries, and travel agencies
offer PACS honeymoon packages.27 '
In this Part, I describe the way in which the PACS was conceived.
This process and legislative history are important because they show
how societal stigma and the way the perception of legal institutions can
change. An analysis of the PACS as a legal institution reveals that,
despite some similarities to other civil unions, it is actually a registered
cohabitation. Subsequently, I present some of the recent studies
examining the populations who use the PACS and the impact of the
PACS on the rate of marriage. Finally, I suggest some lessons that the
United States can take from the French experience and discuss why
those lessons are important, despite the significant legal and cultural
differences between these two countries.
A. Dual Phrpose ofthe PACS
In France, the demand for legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships was the catalyst for the enactment of the PACS, which
267. JoIlle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is It Movipg Towards Marage., 21 INT'L
J.L.Po'Y & FAM. 310, 313 (2007).
268. Prioux, Mazuy & Barbieri, supra note 11, at 377-78.
269. Edward Cody, Sight Couples in Fance Are Choosing Civil Unions Meant for
Gays, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2009, at Al3.
270. Daniel Borrillo & Eric Fassin, The PACS, Four Years Later: A Beginnig or an
End. in SAME-SEX COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS & HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A
Focus ON CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS 19 (Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy eds., 2004).
271. Scott Sayare & Mala De La Baume, In France, Civil Unions Gain Favor over




served as camouflage for the refusal to legalize same-sex marriage.272
At the same time, the French legislature also genuinely wished to
respond to the demographic and social reality of cohabiting opposite-
sex couples.273 This ambivalent attitude, as evidenced by the reasons
for the PACS legislation, explains the uniqueness of the PACS. "[The
PACS] is neither a legal union nor a simple property contract. It is
neither public nor private. It is neither for couples nor for pairs of
friends. It is neither a legal recognition of same-sex couples nor is it
non-recognition."274 It is important to mention that the PACS has been
revised dramatically over the years. Each addition of rights and
alteration to its default rules has triggered a new rise in demand.275
Descriptions of the PACS in this Article are based on current law.
The PACS, signed into law in 1999, was the outcome of a fierce
debate lasting over ten years."' To a large extent, the decision to open
the PACS to both opposite- and same-sex couples was a result of
France's universalism-a defining and fundamental principle of the
republic-and the way it defines and protects human rights."' French
universalism opposes particularism, whether in ethnic, religious, or
national terms, and promises equality before the law, rather than
special treatment."' Under this ideology, no legal institution can be
created solely for a particular group."' For this reason, the biological
272. See Ian Curry-Sumner, Same-Sex Relationships in Europe: Trends Towards
Tolerdnce?, 3 LEGAL PERSP. ON GENDER & SEXUAL EQUALITY 43, 50 (2011); cf CATHERINE
RAISSIGUIER, REINVENTING THE REPUBLIc: GENDER, MIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE
112-28 (2010) (arguing that behind the enactment of the PACS and the debates surrounding it
were homophobic and racist fears that same-sex couples would ruin the family and that the
PACS would lead to increased immigration because it might be used as a vehicle for
immigrants to gain citizenship); see also id. at 131 ("The parliamentary debates that preceded
the passage of the Pacs [sic] clearly demonstrate a strong attachment to heteronormative
family structures . . . .").
273. Cf Robert A. Nye, The Pacte Civil de Soidaritd and the History of Sexuality, 21
FRENCH PoL. CULTURE & Soc'Y 87, 89 (2003) ("One cannot say these views are simply a
matter of anti-homosexual prejudice, tout court"); Claudina Richards, TheLegalRecognidon
ofSame-Sex Couples: The French Perspective, 51 INT'L & CoM. L.Q. 305, 322 (2002).
274. Claude Martin & Irbne Th6ry, The PACS and Marriage and Cohabitadon in
Fance, 15 INT'L J.L. PoL'Y & FAM. 135, 150 (2001).
275. Prioux, Mazuy & Barbieri, supra note 11, at 376.
276. Enda McCaffrey, The PACS Debate and the Implications for Universal Equality
in France, in FRENCH CULTURAL DEBATES 22, 22 (John Marks & Enda McCaffrey eds.,
2001).
277. See, e.g., JOAN WALLACH ScoTT, PARrrt!: SEXUAL EQUALITY AND THE CRISIS OF
FRENCH UNIVERSALISM 104-10 (2005).
278. Naomi Schor, The Crisis ofFench Universalsn, 100 YALE FRENCH STUD. 43, 43
(2001).
279. See Daniel Borrillo, The "Pacte Civil de Solidaitd"in France: Midway Between
Maninge and Cohabitadon, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY
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sex of the individual does not matter under the terms of the PACS.280
In this way, the problem of same-sex couples was collapsed into a
more generalized inquiry into the rights of cohabitants and thus led to
a more universalist definition and recognition of cohabitation."'
Social conditions also played a role in the creation of the PACS.
The PACS offered a solution to an existing societal and legal problem:
the steep rise in the number of cohabiting opposite-sex couples, who
enjoyed only limited partnership rights (which I describe in more detail
below). Therefore, proponents of the PACS claimed that while the
legislation was initially designed to address the interests and needs of
same-sex couples, it may have ended up being more beneficial to
opposite-sex couples.2" Hence, the "gay marriage" problem paved the
way for the creation of a significant societal and legal watershed: legal
recognition of cohabiting couples.
To clarify, I am not idealizing the French legal and political
system. Universalism is often a cover for suppression of human
diversity. The French avoid equating "differences" with "disparate
treatment," but they sometimes also fail to recognize or celebrate
difference. As is widely known, the recognition and celebration of
diversity is critical to identity and social acceptance. But because
French society strives to treat difference as a nonissue, difference-and
sexual difference in particular-is treated as a private matter and is not
acknowledged in the law or discussed in public debates. Thus, as Enda
McCaffrey argues, "Difference, whilst assumed in the concept of 'la
vie priv6e,' is subsumed in the public concept of equality for all."283 In
addition to this difficulty with French law, marriage in France is still
restricted to opposite-sex couples and thus continues to foster
inequality.m2
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 475, 476 (Robert Wintemute & Mads
Andenas eds., 2001).
280. See Scorr, supm note 277, at 104.
281. Id. at 106 ("From this perspective, gay couples could be assimilated to the
category of cohabitants.").
282, M. JEAN-PIERRE MICHEL, LA COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA
LtGISLATION ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION GtNtRALE DE LA RtPUBLIQUE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, No.
1097, Onzibme Ugislature (1998), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/
rapports/r1097.asp.
283. ENDA MCCAFFREY, THE GAY REPUBLIC: SEXUALITY, CITIZENSHIP AND
SUBVERSION IN FRANCE 168 (2005).
284. See Martin & Th6ry, suple note 274, at 263 ("The principle of 'republican
equality'. . .has led to a much more unequal law than in other countries.").
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B. Structure of the PACS A Registered Contactual Cohabitation
The PACS is a legal institution that is different from marriage and
civil unions because it is dedicated to dealing with cohabitation. It is a
more flexible legal institution in that its default rules regarding
partners' obligations are less stringent than those of civil union.285
Other civil union statutes, in defining their terms, often refer to the
marriage law-that is, these laws simply state that the words "civil
union" and "spouse" are equivalent to the words "marriage" and "civil
partner," respectively, as they appear in the marriage law and other
legislation.286 Conversely, the PACS is governed by contract law"' and
is not located in the Code civil in the same place as marriage law.
The PACS also has some important symbolic characteristics and
legal consequences that make it markedly different from marriage. For
instance, while couples get married in the presence of two witnesses at
city hall (a place with cultural authority), a PACS lacks any ritualized
component and is simply registered at the Tribunal d'Instance, a court
that usually deals with routine conflicts, such as disputes between
property owners and tenants.288 Similarly, a PACS is terminated
differently from marriage; a PACS may be immediately terminated if
either party marries or by mutual agreement or may be terminated
three months after a unilateral repudiation is communicated to the
registrar and the other party.2 9 A PACS can also be converted into a
marriage (without any process of dissolution), allowing couples to
avoid some of the procedures associated with marriage, such as the
requirement that news of the marriage be publicized in advance.29
At the same time, the PACS is similar to marriage in many ways.
The PACS contemplates the creation of a committed relationship-a
"life in common," which has been interpreted by the Conseil
constitutionnel (Constitutional Court) as "life as a couple" -not just
285. See Richards, supra note 273, at 322.
286. Eg., Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Law § 10, 750 ILL.
CoMN. STAT. 75/5 (2013) ("[A party to a civil union] shall be included in, any definition or use
of the terms 'spouse,' 'family,' 'immediate fanily,' 'dependent,' 'next of kin,' and other terms
that denote the spousal relationship.").
287. Godard, supm note 267, at 313.
288. See Wilfried Rault, The Best Way to Court: The French Mode of Registation
and Its Impact on the Social Significance ofPartnerships, in SAME-SEX COUPLES, SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS & HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A Focus ON CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS,
supra note 270, at 27, 27.
289. Helen Stalford, Family Law, in PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw 243, 260-61 (John
Bell, Sophie Boyron & Simon Whittaker eds., 2d ed. 2008).
290. Richards, supmnote 273, at 305.
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people sharing a common residence.29' Further evidence of this design
is the law's prohibition against unions between close relatives or
among more than two people29 2 and the requirement that the parties
provide each other with "mutual and material support."293 Unlike
marriage, however, the PACS does not impose the requirement of
fidelity.294
Significantly, the PACS is a contract that is shaped by the parties
themselves, and because it is a contract, the rules of contract law apply
to it.295  In the absence of a specific provision in the contract, the
default rule is separation of property. Article 515-5 of the Code civil
provides that unless there is an agreement to the contrary: "[E]ach
partner keeps the administration, enjoyment and free disposal of his or
her personal property. Each remains alone liable for the debts arising
in his or her self, before or during [the PACS]. ,296 The parties can,
however, easily opt for a joint property regime, as provided by the
law.297 Conversely, in marriage, unless otherwise contracted, the
default rule is the opposite: shared property.
Tellingly, the PACS law does not mention filiation or parental
issues at all.298 While the PACS is silent regarding parental rights,
French law both explicitly and implicitly prohibits joint and second-
parent adoption as well as the use of assisted reproductive technology
by same-sex couples.299 In other words, conjugality and parenthood are
291. Id. at 315.
292. Id. at 317.
293. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 515-4.
294. Stalford, supra note 289, at 246.
295. Richards, supra note 273, at 316.
296. Godard, supra note 267, at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 515-5-1.
298. Nye, supra note 273, at 89.
299. Article 343 of the Code civil provides that only married couples may adopt.
CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 343. Because same-sex couples cannot get married, joint adoption is
prohibited. Until recently, the only way gay people in France were able to adopt was by
concealing their sexual orientation during the application process. Camille Robcis, How the
Symbolic Became French: Kinship andRepublicanism m the PACS Debates, 26 DISCOURSE
110, 113-14 (2004). The ban was lifted in 2008 after the European Court of Human Rights
ruled that French law discriminated against LGB people. E.B. v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, 93
(2008), available at http://hvdoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-84571
(finding that a refusal to allow an unmarried lesbian to adopt violates the nondiscrimination
principle guaranteed by article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights). However,
second-parent adoption, the process in which one partner adopts the legal child of the other, is
still restricted to opposite-sex couples; this ban was recently and unsuccessfully challenged in
the European Court of Human Rights. See Gas v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109572; see also Connie Cho,




two different issues in France, and the PACS is less privileged than
marriage in that regard.
C What Makes the PACS So Useful to Couples i Nonmaital
Relationships?
While the reasons for the PACS's success are not yet totally
clear" and are the subject of much scholarly inquiry, I suggest that the
following characteristics make the PACS an attractive and necessary
legal institution.
1. The PACS Provides More Rights for Unmarried Couples and
Responds to a Societal Need
What makes the PACS a really attractive alternative is that it
provides a valuable response to a demographic trend-the decline in
the number of marriages and the rise of nonmarital unions and the
associated legal and societal consequences of that decline. Before
1970, it was rare for couples in France to live together outside
marriage."o' Starting in the 1970s, the number of people choosing to
do so rose steeply.302
Despite these societal changes, the legal system did not follow
suit, and cohabitating couples in France enjoyed very limited rights.303
The legal situation of cohabiting couples started to change only during
the 1970s, when the Cour de cassation (the supreme court for judicial
matters) ruled that in a case for wrongful death, the surviving partner
("However, government legislation tightly controls access to ARTs-only heterosexual,
young, medically infertile couples that have been married or have cohabitated for at least two
years are eligible.").
300. The reason couples choose the PACS over marriage has been under-investigated
because, among other reasons, until 2007 the data published by the French Ministry of Justice
did not include such details as the sex of the partners and the mean duration of dissolved
PACSs. See BADGETr, supm note 105, at 62; Prioux, Mazuy & Barbieri, supra note 11, at
378. In addition, as the PACS has expanded to offer more rights, the reasons for registration
have become more varied. For example, after the 2005 change that allowed PACSed couples
to file joint tax returns, there was an increase in the number of registered partners. See
Marion Leturcq, Would You Civil Union Me? Civil Unions and Taxes in Fmnce: Did the
Reform of Income Taxation Raise the Rate of Civil Unions? (Paris Sch. of Econ., Working
Paper No. 2009-17, 2009).
301. Martin & Th6ry, supra note 274, at 135-36.
302. Id.
303. Kees Waaldijk, Levels of Legal Consequences of Marniage, Cohabitation and
Registerd Partnership for Different-Sex and Same-Sex Partners: Comparative Oveiew &
Comparative Analysis, In SAME-SEX COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS & HOMOSEXUAL
MARRIAGES: A Focus ON CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS, supra note 270, at 47, 80-83.
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has standing even if the couple was not married." This case was
followed by piecemeal legislation that provided some rights to
cohabiting opposite-sex couples, especially in the areas of parental
rights and social welfare.3 05
With the enactment of the PACS, informal cohabitation status
was also written into the law for the first time. According to article
515-8 of the Code civl, "Cohabitation is a de facto [union,
characterized by a life in common, offering a character of stability and
continuity,] between two persons, of different sexes or of the same sex
living together as a couple."O' The law does not, however, specify the
amount of time necessary to establish cohabitation or what evidence is
required to prove stability and continuity.30 ' Moreover, the law does
not specify what legal privileges or obligations exist between the
partners. The legislature's intention in adding a definition of
cohabitation was only to clarify that same-sex couples can also enjoy
the rights of informal cohabitation,' which the French courts had
denied to them prior to the legislation.30
Informally cohabiting couples can get a certiiicat de vie
commune or certficat de concubnage, that is, a certificate bestowed
by the mayor or a notary confirming that a couple is cohabiting."' The
couple must declare that they are living together and provide some
supporting evidence, for example, a contract showing a common
residence.' These certificates, however, have no legal power and do
not provide any rights; they simply help couples prove to others that
they are cohabiting if they claim the limited benefits for which they are
eligible.312
Even today, the rights of informally cohabiting couples are quite
limited, and the parties do not have any obligations to each other.'
When it comes to financial issues, property division, and medical
304. Godard, supm note 267, at 318.
305. Id.
306. Id at 312 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Waaldijk, supm
note 303.
307. Richards, supra note 273, at 321.
308. BOwMAN, supmnote 15, at 211.
309. Richards, supranote 273, at 311-13.
310. Id at 321.
311. SYLVIEDIBos-LACROUx, PACS: LE GUIDE PRAHIQUE 126 (13th ed. 2009).
312. Stalford, supra note 289, at 255.
313. See Daniel Borrillo & Kees Waaldijk, Major Legal Consequences of Marnage,
Cohabitation and Registerd Partneshp for Different-Sex and Same-Sex Partners in Fance,
in MORE OR LESS TOGETHER 93, 95-101 (Kees Waaldijk ed., 2005) ("Informal cohabitation
produces very limited legal consequences, essentially connected with social law: health
insurance, reductions for certain forms of transport, etc.").
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decision-making rights, informally cohabiting couples simply do not
have any rights.314 For instance, a member of a cohabiting couple
cannot use the name of their partner in any official capacity."' While
many privileges are denied to informal cohabitants, the law recognizes
them as couples for the purpose of Social Security and other
allowances, which may contribute to a reduction in eligibility for
allowances (because the income of both partners is calculated when
determining their needs)."
A PACS provides a better legal status for unmarried couples
because it "represents a kind of compromise between marriage and
cohabitation, drawing on the legal security and clarity associated with
the former, and the freedom and flexibility associated with the latter.""
For example, in France, most registered couples pay less income tax
than individuals do."' Informal cohabitants cannot file a joint tax
return, while "PACSed" couples, like married couples, can.'
Similarly, the surviving member of an informally cohabiting couple
must pay inheritance taxes when their partner dies, but the surviving
member of a PACS is exempted.320 Partners in informal cohabitations
do not owe each other any level of support during their life together,
while those in a PACS must provide mutual assistance during their
union.32 After dissolution, however, neither PACSed couples nor
informally cohabitating couples are obliged to pay spousal support
(unless they contracted otherwise).322 The PACS, like informal
cohabitation, does not confer automatic inheritance rights or
entitlements equivalent to survivor's benefits. When it comes to
parental rights, the legal situation of opposite-sex couples-regardless
of their marital status-is the same in informal cohabitations and
PACSs, because the PACS provides no better legal status than does
informal cohabitation in this regard.323
314. Martin & Th6ry, supm note 274, at 142-43.
315. Stalford, supra note 289, at 255.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 258.
318. Godard, supm note 267, at 315.
319. Leturcq, supra note 300, at 2-3.
320. DIBOs-LACROUX, supranote 311, at 160.
321. Id. at 130.
322. Godard, supm note 267, at 318.
323. See Stalford, supra note 289, at 261; Catherine LaBrusse-Riou, Family Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 263, 269-81 (George A. Bermann & Etienne Picard eds.,
2008) ("[O]nce there are children, cohabitation becomes a situation legally recognized as
equivalent to marriage . . . .").
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Cohabitation before marriage is now the norm among French
couples, and the PACS works perfectly for the trial period before
marriage-a period that has become longer in the past decade.324
Indeed, marriage was the reason for the dissolution of PACSs in 34%
of cases in 2009 and 47% of cases in 2007.325 In addition, unlike
marriage, the PACS is easily dissolved. While French divorce law was
reformed in 2004 and the procedure for dissolution has become easier,
"divorce remains a painful and often litigious matter."3 26 French
divorce law is complicated, but for the purposes of this Article, it is
enough to point out that even a divorce based on mutual consent
requires an order of the family court and a review of the divorce
agreement by a family court judge.3 27 The PACS dissolution process is
easier and less expensive than divorce.328
In summary, the PACS's virtue is in its necessity and flexibility:
it is a legal institution that meets the needs of a large number of people
and the diverse kinds of relationship arrangements in which those
people engage. But the PACS has another prominent virtue-it is an
alternative that is not associated with marriage's symbolism and acts to
reduce the harm that symbolism creates.
2. The PACS Provides an Alternative Free of the Symbolic Harm of
Marriage
The PACS reduces the symbolic harm of marriage in several
ways. First, the PACS lacks the religious ritual of marriage. Of
course, marriage in France is civil marriage,329 but it still has religious
connotations.330 Moreover, marriage is also perceived by some as
heterosexist and historically discriminatory against women.
Interviews conducted by Wilfried Rault and Muriel Letrait confirm
that couples who choose the PACS are more secular and more
concerned about the religious symbolism of marriage. A survey
conducted in 2005 found that while about 46% of PACSed people
expressed some distance from or hostility to religious ritual, only about
16% of married people who did not cohabitate before marriage shared
324. Godard, supm note 267, at 311 (stating that nine marriages in ten start in
cohabitation).
325. Prioux, Mazuy & Barbieri, supra note 11, at 376-77.
326. LaBrusse-Riou, supra note 323, at 278.
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., Cody, supra note 269.
329. LaBrusse-Riou, supmnote 323, at 269.
330. Sayare & De La Baume, supra note 271 ("[M]arriage is still viewed here as a
'heavy and invasive' institution with deep ties to Christianity.").
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those sentiments."' The same survey posed a variety of questions
examining respondents' attitudes concerning the division of gender
roles."' Only 6% of PACSed couples viewed gender roles as being
very different, while 17% of married people did."
Second, the solemnization process-which some find offensive,
unnecessary, or too public33 4-is required by marriage but not by the
PACS.' Marriage is a much more formal process: the couple has to
publicly announce its intention to marry in advance so people have an
opportunity to object, and the bride's and groom's information
(including their names, professions, and future addresses) must be
posted on the door of their city hall at least ten days before the
wedding."' Both parties are also required to submit certificates
confirming that they have had a medical exam in the two months prior
to the wedding."' The formalization of the PACS simply involves
registration and does not require the couple to exchange vows publicly
and in the presence of a state representative and witnesses. Couples
who choose the PACS often see their unions as private matters."' They
view the public nature of marriage as an intrusion and the PACS as
offering more sovereignty over their relationships.
In the same way, couples who choose the PACS often see their
relationships as more authentic and not a result of social pressure or
state intervention."' To them, marriage seems to be a fusion of two
people, while the PACS is a umon between two people.340 Some
331. Wilfried Rault & Muriel Letrait, Choi dupacte civil de solidarit6 et rpport Ila
rehgion, 96 POLITIQUES SOCIALES ET FAMILIALES 41, 49-50, 50 fig.3 (2009).
332. The respondents, individuals who were married or PACSed between 1999 and
2005 and had not dissolved their unions, were asked to describe their attitudes toward a few
situations, such as the following: during an employment crisis, men should have priority over
women for securing employment; and if a woman does not wish to be in a relationship with a
man, she should be able to have a child and raise it by herself. Wilfried Rault et al., Formes
d'unions diff6rentes, profils distmets? Une comparaison despacpacsd.e.s. en couple de sexe
diffrent et des maid.e.s., 1 SOCIoLoGIE 319, 326 n.29 (2010).
333. Id. at 327 tbl.4.
334. Cf Katherine Franke, Delaware New Civ Union Law-Read It Befor You
Applaud HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2011, 7:14 PM), http://www.huffimgtonpost.com/
katherine-fi-anke/delawares-new-civil-union b850117.html (arguing that there is no good
reason to require a solemnization ceremony in civil unions).
335. DIBOS-LACROUX, supa note 311, at 126.
336. Id; Stalford, supra note 289, at 245-46.
337. Stalford, supa note 289, at 245-46.
338. WILFRIED RAULT, LINVENTION DU PACS, PRATIQUES ET SYMBOLIQUES D'UNE
NOUVELLE FORME D'UNION 55-57 (2009).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 58.
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couples have also indicated that they do not want the demands of
fidelity that are required by marriage.34
The PACS may help couples avoid the cost of a marriage
ceremony, which is often quite high. It has been suggested, as well,
that some couples take advantage of the PACS to avoid the drama
surrounding marriage,342 while anecdotal evidence shows that an
industry has started to develop around the PACS.343 In fact, interviews
with PACSed couples demonstrate that they feel they have greater
flexibility in planning a ceremony and less pressure to conform to
tradition and also that they prefer smaller ceremonies to which they
invite only close friends and that allow them to avoid the usual social
obligations associated with wedding ceremonies.4
D Lessons for the United States
The French experience provides some valuable lessons to the
United States. It shows that societal views of the PACS have gradually
changed as people come to see the PACS less as a tool for same-sex
couples and more as a legitimate and popular alternative to informal
cohabitation."' Thus, it does not matter that the PACS-like its
American counterparts-was created mainly to deal with the issue of
same-sex couples. In addition, the French experience offers a narrative
different from that proffered by traditionalists: PACSed couples are
often people who, in the absence of the availability of such an option,
would still cohabitate informally. The creation of an alternative
registration "has encouraged more couples to officialize their unions in
a legal framework."" That is, while the PACS has caused a decline in
the number of marriages, the total number of couples who are
registered or married has risen since the introduction of the PACS. It is
clear, then, that the PACS has not led to the dire consequences
predicted by traditionalists. In fact, the opposite is true: as mentioned
previously, the primary reason for the dissolution of a PACS is
conversion to marriage. Thus it seems that alternative registration
341. Idat59.
342. Cf Cody, supa note 269 (reporting on a couple who returned to their everyday
business immediately after getting PACSed and who concluded that "[t]he white dress,
champagne and honeymoon would be for later, perhaps much later-perhaps never").
343. Cf id.; Prioux&Mazuysuponote 10, at4lO.
344. RAuLT, supm note 338, at 60.
345. See, e.g., Sayare & De La Baume, supra note 271 (interviewing a recently
PACSed individual who indicated, "For me, before, the PACS was for homosexual couples"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
346. Prioux, Mazuy & Barbieri, supmnote 11, at 376.
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provides yet another framework for testing a relationship before
marriage and encourages people to mediate and understand their
rights.
The PACS does have some disadvantages. Whereas in Belgium,
the registration is open to couples "in a communal living situation,"
including family members and friends,347 in France, family members
may not register; while it is not stated by the law, the Conseil
constitutionnelhas determined that in order for a PACS to be valid, the
partners must live together "as a couple."348 Hence, the PACS is more
limited in its scope than this Article's suggested RCR.
In addition, according to Bowman, only 2% of French couples
sign a contract, and the rest simply sign the PACS declaration and
follow its default rules.349 This may indeed constitute a disadvantage of
the PACS. However, because the PACS is different from marriage, it
still fulfills many components of a registered cohabitation institution
and serves as a middle-ground institution between marriage and
cohabitation. The lesson is, however, that with the creation of a legal
institution that is built on contract, the state needs to provide a method
(such as a form that is easy to use) that makes contracts more available
and accessible.
E Is the French ModelApplicable to the United States?
Bowman argues that the French model does not suit the United
States for three reasons. First, she states that the registration-based
model adopted in France is not suitable to protect American
cohabitants because French couples who informally cohabit have more
rights related to partnership than their American counterparts and are
also protected by the social welfare system in a way that Americans are
not."o (Moreover, she asserts that informal cohabitants in France are
not truly protected upon dissolution in the way that married couples in
France are.)' Second, she contends that most people find the benefits
and obligations of the PACS to be unclear and often confusing. Third,
347. Frederik Swennen & Yves-Henri Leleu, National Report: Belgium, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. Pol'Y & L. 57, 73 (2011).
348. Godard, supra note 267, at 313.
349. Bowman received this data through an interview with a French law professor.
My efforts to find any support for this claim or other data have failed. While there is reason
to believe that many people do not deposit a contract, the high number is surprising
considering the fact that there are many forms of contracts available via the Internet and
books and the fact that notaries in France are skilled in drafting such contracts.




the legislation of the PACS was unique because it was the result of
national debate. In the United States, conversely, Bowman asserts that
legal change will take place incrementally-not at the federal level but
at the state level-and will involve a more piecemeal process in which
one issue at a time is dealt with.352
Bowman's main mistake is that she measures the suitability of the
French model in accordance with what she thinks the law should
achieve: the protection of vulnerable cohabitants upon dissolution."'
However, the intention of a PACS model (and the RCR model) is more
ambitious: to encourage people to define their rights and organize
their relationships in a way that suits them. Thus when Bowman
asserts that informal cohabitants in France enjoy greater rights than
their American counterparts and receive better protections upon the
dissolution of their relationships,354 she disregards the fact that legal
recognition has other purposes and benefits beyond protecting people
upon dissolution. She also misses the point that the PACS (and the
RCR) offers important state-granted rights and benefits for couples
during and at the end of their relationship.
Concerning her other objections, there is no proof that the French
find the PACS to be overwhelmingly complicated-at least, no more
so than the very complicated divorce law and property regimes in
France. The fact that the number of registrations grows each time
more rights are added to the PACS would seem to indicate that people
are aware of and able to understand the PACS, at least well enough to
enter into one. Additionally, the Internet provides many clear
explanations of the PACS, and there are several books about its legal
implications that are aimed toward a general audience."' Finally,
regarding the incremental argument, it seems that Bowman
underestimates the fact that American versions of potential PACS
already exist in the different alternatives to marriage adopted by a
number of states. While a piecemeal process at the state level is,
indeed, the way that the RCR will be created, that is not a valid
352. Idat213-14.
353. Id at 222.
354. This is an assertion that is debatable because American cohabitants can win ex
post remedies, while in France it is extremely difficult to win such rights. See Stalford, supm
note 289, at 256.
355. See, e.g., DIBos-LACROUX, supra note 311; Inheitance Planning im France:
French Civil Partneship-PACS, FRENCH-PROPERTY.COM, http://www.french-property.
com/guide/france/finance-taxation/inheritance/pacs/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (informing a
prospective PACSed couple about the procedure and advising them that the notary fee for a
PACS agreement is around E500).
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argument against the RCR or other such schemes; this is the way the
federalist structure of the United States functions.
This leads to another fundamental issue: perhaps the cultural and
legal differences between France and the United States make
comparative family law irrelevant. Indeed, I have stated elsewhere
that, although comparison with Europe on issues of marriage law is
beneficial, it is also risky because of the differences in legal theory,
culture, level of social security, and religiousness."' Of course, France
is significantly different from the United States in many ways that are
fundamentally relevant to the development of family law. Among
these, religiousness, separation of church and state, and tradition stand
out as the most significant."' These factors affect the different
approaches these countries have taken in two ways: in the United
States, there has been stronger resistance than in France to the creation
of marriage alternatives, especially among traditionalists, and the
general American public tends to attach stronger cultural significance
to marriage and show more commitment to it."'
Nevertheless, while these are important differences, a few
elements make the French experience applicable. For one thing, the
reality is that in the United States, as in France, there is a growing
societal need to craft a family law that is responsive to the situation at
hand. The number of divorces, nonmarital unions, and children born
to unmarried parents necessitates a response from the courts and,
eventually, the political system. Furthermore, the creation of an
alternative to marriage in both France and the United States originated
not from concerns for the well-being of unmarried heterosexual
couples, but from the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples.
Importantly, the idea of civil unions and alternatives to marriage is a
globalized one. The United States has not been disconnected from the
events relevant to the move toward same-sex marriage in Europe and
will not be disconnected from the development of a menu of
alternatives. In fact, the opposite is true: in their rulings concerning
356. Aloni, supra note 9, at 139-40.
357. Id
358. See NANCY E COrT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2
(2000) ("From the founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions about the
importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply implanted in public policy
. . . ."); The Decline ofMninge andRie ofNew Faulesh PEw RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/thedecline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2
("Americans have a unique relationship with marriage. Compared with most other western




same-sex marriage, a few American courts have taken direction from
the European example."' And finally, while some in the United States
do attach more importance to marriage than the French do, American
values and attitudes concerning family life are changing rapidly. It
may take time for the idea of an RCR-type alternative to become
reality, but in the same way that cohabitation was once considered
deviant, and same-sex marriage unthinkable, some form of alternative
registration will succeed in achieving acceptance, even if it is only in
the more progressive states.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growth of alternative families is one of the biggest changes
witnessed by the Western world over the past few decades. While
family structure and lifestyle continue to change, the law is very slow
to do so and has been inadequate in its response. One of the things this
Article observes-although it is perhaps too early for such an
observation because the law is unsettled-is that some countries have
chosen between two different directions in handling the proliferation of
unmarried couples and alternative family arrangements. One group of
nations, best represented by New Zealand, has chosen to grant
cohabitants full rights, similar to those enjoyed by married couples, by
imposing marital status upon them. The second group, best
represented by Belgium and France, has granted informal cohabitants
only limited rights and, in doing so, has encouraged them to register
and organize their relationships in registered cohabitations.
This Article observes these two different directions in regulating
relationships of unmarried couples and suggests that the United States
may benefit from choosing the second way. I recognize that changes
such as those proposed here would have a profound impact on U.S.
culture and, for that reason, it would most likely take years before they
were widely accepted. At the same time, changes in family law and
structure in the United States over the past two decades have been so
dramatic that the changes I suggest might move more quickly than we
can now envision. In any case, an alternative to marriage-not just a
duplication of marriage, but a real alternative, whether it is my
proposed RCR regime or something else-is an idea whose time has
come. The legal infrastructure and knowledge necessary for its
359. See, eg., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (referring to articles on
Denmark's and Norway's registered partnership schemes when explaining that the remedy
can be civil union rather than marriage).
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introduction already exist-and the societal situation demands it.
Every suggested new model, including the RCR, risks repeating the
problems of the models that precede it. But the RCR's flexibility and
responsiveness to a social need may allow it to avoid some of the
pitfalls of other institutions created for the legal recognition of
relationships. It is circular reasoning to argue that, because marriage is
so important and special, the people in the United States would not
want an alternative institution. The law itself is what currently makes
marriage "special"-and culture responds accordingly. Until we try to
provide other options, marriage will remain culturally superior and
people will continue to choose it or nothing at all. But changes in the
law can-and do-affect culture.
Several questions remain open for future research. Is it possible
to make a menu of options simple and accessible? How would each
"institution of choice" conflict, or integrate, with the others? How can
we secure the rights of informal cohabitants while allowing people to
keep their autonomy? Similarly, is there a way to expand rights for
informal cohabitants without expanding the shadow of marriage?
How paternalistic should courts be in cases of ex post lawsuits based
on an RCR? These are only a few of the questions that remain open. I
hope that this Article will help promote solutions to these critical
issues and evoke grater conversation about the regulation of
relationships in the United States.
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